CHAPTER 2

External Support and Military Coups D'état During the Cold War

The External Actor

This chapter seeks to find out, conceptualize, and elucidate the 'role' arguably played by the United States, one of the two most powerful external actors in military coups d'état during the period of the Cold War. This is not to say, however, that the USA was the only actor interested in influencing coups and coup outcomes in other places. Both the other superpower during the Cold War, the Soviet Union (David 1987, pp. 69–105), and regional actors in the Middle East, such as Saudi Arabia and Libya, supported coups elsewhere. (Tansey 2017, p. 149; "US Embassy Cables: Saudi" 2010; David 1987, p. 3) Without failing to acknowledge that there can be different external actors, this book focuses on the actions of the United States. What this requires in the first place is to clarify what is meant when 'the United States' is referred to as an external actor. However, discussing the role of the USA per se may be a misnomer on the ground that different US agencies may have given different responses to the same event.[1] Conceivably, the way in which the State Department officially responded to an event may have differed from the perspective adopted by the Pentagon or the White House.

[1] Nogaylaroğlu also stressed the plurality of domestic political actors in the United States that vie for power and influence when he said that 'there are 100 Americas. Some people say they talked to America. But we need to ask them who did they talked with? Which America did they meet?' (personal communication, June 9, 2015).

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These clashes of perspectives had become a common feature of successive US administrations, especially since the founding of the Central Intelligence Agency (Clarridge and Diehl, p. 62). For instance, during Henry Kissinger's term as Secretary of State (1973–1977), the power was concentrated in the White House and the National Security Council, which regularly clashed with the State Department and, at times, also with the Pentagon (Bass 2013, pp. 9–10; Inderfurth 2003, p. 22).[2]

Differences of opinion may more likely emerge in cases of coups between different US government agencies. Interestingly, similar to its demands for Turkey to cut down the size of its military early in the military, the USA also wanted Pakistan to reduce the size of its military establishment because there was no point, according to State Department officials, in Pakistan maintaining its large military apparatus. Two departments, the State Department and the Pentagon, did not see eye to eye on this and the general wisdom in maintaining US—Pakistan relations, particularly regarding the substantial economic and military assistance (McMahon 1994, p. 253). Indeed, in other matters and in different time periods the CIA has all too often acted on its own without little or no consultation with other relevant departments.[3] In response to the 1967 colonels' coup in Greece, for instance, the former United States Ambassador to Athens, Robert Keeley, said that the CIA was almost jubilant after the coup and the US military thought the coup makers were worthy of US support because they were pro-US, patriotic officers (p. 103; see also Blood 1998, pp. 34–38).

The Pentagon played a major role in policy-making in Washington at the time, though they deferred to the embassy regarding matters in Athens. But military officers had their own bureaucratic concerns, according to Keeley, especially concerning the suspension of a large part of military aid because it disturbed their relationship with fellow Greek officers, etc. (Keeley 2010, p. 104). And the JUSMAGG (Joint US Military Assistance Group Greece) was actually working under the EUCOM [United States European Command], the head of which was General David Burchinal, approached the post-coup government

[2] For a tight race between Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski to influence President Carter, see Albright (2003, pp. 87–88).

[3] Writing in a letter in 1977, Arthur Schlesinger Jr., former spy and intelligence analyst for the Office of Strategic Services and later speechwriter and special assistant to US President John F. Kennedy, said that "CIA was a rogue elephant from way back". See Schlesinger and Schlesinger (2013, pp. 453, 491).

favorably because they were pro-US, pro-NATO and EUCOM's policy recommendations to the US government expressed positive sentiments towards the coup (Keeley 2010, p. 104). This shows how different US, and even NATO offices, departments involved in overall policy-making may respond to the same event. Though this does not guarantee that the USA may have followed a similar policy in other places, it is instructive to demonstrate both policy priorities of the US governments during the Cold War as well as differing reactions of its various policy-formulating bodies such as the CIA and the Pentagon. Mindful of a similar scenario in the case of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, this book will pay attention to different US actors involved in policy-making and decision-making processes before, during, and after the four cases of coups discussed here.

Parameters of US Foreign Policy

All that being said, it may be useful to delineate the contours and principles of US foreign policy during the Cold War as regards military coups d'état in the rest of the world. Risking some dose of generalization and simplification across several US administrations and simplification, one may say that US foreign policy during the Cold War was dominated by the doctrine of *realism*, whether the region of concern and that policy was the Middle East, East Asia, Latin America, Africa[4] and South Asia (Abramowitz 2009, p. 92; Djerejian 1995, p. 1; see also Djerejian 2008, p. 25; Rice 2008). "Against the backdrop of the Cold War neither domestic civil society nor the international community valued democracy as unconditionally and was not willing to stand up for it so forcefully as after the Cold War. Hence, the costs associated with the use of force at home were lower" (Hunter 1998, p. 298). The United States applied 'political conditionality' very selectively when faced with extra-constitutional power grabs around the world (Masaki 2016, p. 51).

[4]As William Milam, a retired diplomat, said about the 1968 coup d'état against President Modibo Keita in Mali, the United States did not like coup d'état too much but in this case they did not cut off assistance or their relations did not rupture over the coup. They hoped that the new government would be more pro-western and more sympathetic to the UN than deposed President. Milam 2015, pp. 27–28; see also the account by Thomas Pickering, then US Ambassador to Nigeria (1981–1983), on how the US Embassy dealt with the coups and coup makers in Pickering 2015, p. 153.

What mattered for security relations between the USA and other countries was whether or not that particular country was in the Western camp. Thus, 'stability' entrenched itself as the buzzword. This implied that it was sufficient for the United States if a third country maintained a democratic façade as long as the country was politically stable and posed no risk of sliding to the Soviet camp (Brown 2005, pp. 179–198, pp. 180–181; İlter Türkmen, personal communication, November 16, 2015; Ahmet Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015; Hikmet Bayar, personal communication August 8, 2015). As much as whether or not a country was ruled by democracy, especially if that country was a NATO member, ideally mattered for the USA, deviations from ideal values were tolerable. Recently declassified US archives show that the USA resorted to covert operations and instigated coups against duly elected governments in these regions to advance its geopolitical interests (Masaki 2016, p. 54). A military coup d'état, which sometimes caused blood to be spilt, involved persecutions, and ended in the installation of military dictatorships or authoritarian governments, provided the most accurate litmus test. A former US ambassador, Michael W. Cotter, offers a very succinct summary of how the United States viewed the issue of coup d'état in the context of the Cold War:

> It frustrates me so much when you now see revisionist history, after the Cold War is over, which simply discounts how all of us felt in the early 1970s about the course of the fight against Godless Communism and for domination of the world. In fact, that conflict was in serious doubt in the late 1960s and early 1970s. We were clearly engaged in ideological, and in some places, a shooting battle. There were clearly sides on these things. In Chile, Allende was the wrong side and Pinochet was the right side, with whatever casualties came later as a result. (Cotter 2002, p. 37)

In the environment of the Cold War a military coup d'état could be preferred over the loss of an important ally in a strategically important landscape. This is why 'military coup' clearly existed in the ideational reservoir of top policy officials during the revolutionary crisis in Iran in 1979 (Brzezinski, pp. 373, 379–382, 393). It was also often the case that giving external support to coup makers and military governments was eased by the idea that 'militaries in Pakistan, Brazil, Egypt, Turkey and elsewhere demonstrated that militaries are able to seize power and govern' (Brzezinski, p. 395).

Playing a Role in Three Stages

An external actor may theoretically play 'role' in military coups d'état in another country in three stages. In the pre-coup stage, an external actor may become directly involved in the coup plots, actively guide and support a coup attempt. It is also possible that an external actor may give signals to coup plotters that it would tolerate the coup if it were to occur. In this context, signals can be defined as "actions or statements that potentially allow an actor to infer something about unobservable, but salient, properties of another actor" (Gartzke quoted in Shannon et al. 2015, p. 365). Signals may be given indirectly over how a US government treats an incumbent government. If the bilateral relationship between a government in one country and a US government has gone really sour and hostile messages are delivered, this may send a signal to domestic rivals of that government that the USA may support their anti-coup action. According to Thyne,

> hostile signals channeled from the USA [against an incumbent government] should increase coup plotters' perceived probability of staging a successful coup… because they give the plotters an advantage over the government in solidifying power once the coup is attempted, and deplete the resources available to the government to deter coup attempts by blocking foreign aid or international investment. (Thyne 2010, p. 451)

Signals may matter more in places where regimes have weak or alienated domestic bases, as in the case of Pakistan more: "…[The r]egime in Pakistan have relied on intimacy with governments to bolster their domestic confidence and signal their political opponents that the US is lined up behind them" (Hussain 1990, p. 128). The USA may give such signals in two ways: it may either have a bad relationship with the incumbent government, from which coup planning officers may infer possible tolerance by the external actor. Or, alternatively, the external actor may be in direct contact with the conspiring officers through different means and relay to them that it would understand a coup and therefore promise not to put pressure on them if they were to take action against desired targets.

It is important to note that signals are not abstract things; political actors, whether civilian governments, insurgents, or armed forces, do look out for signals and try to make sense of them before they get

on to their intended action. These actors use signals to "make sense of their relationships. Public naming and shaming, private diplomacy, as well as aid or cooperation measures are all cues sent to partner governments about the dynamics of their mutual relations" (Huber 2012). Signals given by as powerful an external actor as the United States may also have an influence on other issues. For instance, mixed signals and unambiguous US green light partly allowed for human rights abuses in Latin America (Sikkink 2004, pp. 109–110, 111–115). "Decisions about military and economic aid are cues or signals given by one country to another. Policy makers use these cues to make sense of the relationship between two countries. Making sense involves interpreting these cues by linking them to existing, well-learned cognitive structures, such as dominant foreign policy frameworks and perceptions of state identity" (Sikkink 2004, pp. 102–103). Shannon et al. believe that even "cheap signals have important implications, because they signal the tolerance of the international community for coups. Silence or support may inspire coups elsewhere, while widespread condemnation may lead to countercoups and widespread uprisings" (Shannon et al. 2015, p. 364).

Signals may be given by different persons, ranging from an ambassador to more high-level officials and agencies such as the CIA.[5] They may be sought by not only military officers, but also civilian officials before taking a potentially divisive step or making a controversial decision. To illustrate, before Pakistan's President Farooq Leghari (1993–1997) dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in November 1996, a well-known Pakistani diplomat and former Foreign Minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, who was very well connected due to his previous governmental posts, and Syed Refaqat Khan, General Zia's former Chief of Staff, visited US Ambassador Thomas Simons for tea and looked for signals from the Ambassador to assess the US commitment to Bhutto. They figured that if the USA is not too committed to Bhutto, the likely cost of ousting her would be significantly diminished. Ambassador Simons understood why they came, but still says that if he signaled through his "tepid reaction to the calls of Yaqub Khan and Refaqat Khan" the absence of deep US attachment to her, this was unintentional (Simons 2013, pp. 217–219).

[5] For a directive from President Kennedy to the CIA allowing the latter to give discreet positive signal of support to any potential conspiratorial group against growing leftist current in Brazil, see Weiner (2008, pp. 189, 311).

With the much-needed assurance the visitors must have derived from the Ambassador's comments, President Leghari sacked PM Bhutto in November 1996.

Another example from post-Cold War Pakistan may give a clearer illustration. Nawaz reports that when his brother, the Commander of Armed Services Asif Nawaz, visited the USA for the first time after US sanctions had been imposed on Pakistan due to the development of the Pakistani nuclear program in the late 1980s, he visited the CIA in addition to other high-level Defense and National Security Council officials and asked them if they wanted the military to upend the government of Nawaz Sharif. He based his question upon the *signals* he said he was being given by the USA. Unfortunately, in his report on the episode Nawaz does not clarify what these signals were, however. The General was urged by Yusuf Haroon, a leading Pakistani businessman living in the USA, to dismiss the government and take over and was assured that he would have no problem in garnering the necessary US support for such action (Nawaz 2008, p. 453).

Returning back to the issue of signaling, officers intending to carry out a coup may *demand* these signals themselves or the external actor may want to give hints of these during any ordinary conversation. The previously mentioned example of Zeinel Abedin Ben-Ali consulting with the US Embassy officials and asking for signals if he took over can be characterized as the decisive signal an aspiring Prime Minister eagerly expected to hear before moving on to action. This process of requesting and receiving signals from US administrations may have been more straightforward and direct. For example, the Egyptian Free Officers told the US Embassy their intentions to assume power before the coup in 1952 and promised to honor their international obligations if they managed to carry out the coup (Kandil 2014, pp. 15, 24; see also Meyers and Brysac 2008, pp. 363, 373).

More, as Demirel pointed out in the case of the 1980 coup d'état in Turkey, "if the Western allies of Turkey, particularly the United States, in addition to civilian domestic groups, gave *hints* that they would not support the coup, Turkish military would have thought twice before acting" (Demirel 2003, p. 269; italics added). Lefever says that when military officers planned intervention during the Cold War they approached the US advisers. But these advisers stayed neutral in most cases, except when they considered the coup a 'constructive coup', "those with some chance of correcting gross corruption or subversion" (p. 287). If Washington

thinks, however, that the coup would enhance its interests, a US ambassador may authorize military advisers to give advice to execute the coup more efficiently. This may have what happened with the 1965 coup in Congo (Zaire) (Lefever 1980, p. 288). As important as signals may be, there may also be other mechanisms through which an external actor plays a role. As Thyne himself suggested, signals were important in the Latin American coup cases but there may be other mechanisms to be uncovered (Thyne 2010, p. 460).

The second phase to possibly observe support by an external actor may be during the coup. In addition to giving 'signals', foreign support for military intervention may provide a loose, but essential 'international opportunity structure' (Croissant 2004, p. 364). In other words, if international organizations such as the Organization of American States (OAS), NATO, the UN and foreign powers support a civilian government against military intervention—they possess the means to do so if they want to—this narrows down political options for the military (Croissant 2004, p. 364). Although military coups d'état typically started and finished quickly during the Cold War (Luttwak 1979, pp. 146–148; Wiatr 1971, p. 64), this second stage is still a *very critical* phase to observe the support or its lack thereof by the external actor. This stage still allows the United States to project its view *despite* the short span of the coup. For instance, when the CIA reported in late April 1963 that a pro-Nasser coup was in the offing in Jordan, US President Kennedy ordered the 6th Fleet to position in the eastern Mediterranean to be ready for action any time (Little 1995, p. 530). In this case, although the 6th Fleet could have not made it to its destination on time to prevent the coup, President Kennedy's decision itself was intended as the decisive signal. In another case, when Colonel Gringo Honasan tried to overthrow civilian government in Philippines in 1989 the US rejected the coup and made sure that the government stayed intact. When there was yet another coup attempt soon after, the USA flew airplanes from Clark Air Base nearby as a *demonstration* to deter the coup (italics added) (Platt 1998, p. 18; Wright and Mann 1990).

The third phase is the final one, where the external support may be particularly important in determining the fate of the coup and its perpetrators. This is related to the fact that the new leaders are at their most vulnerable in the early moments and days of the coup. This explains why, given their concerns about a possible British intervention to reinstall King Farouk in the early days of the 1952 coup, Aly Sabri, the head

of Egyptian air force intelligence and Free Officer's emissary to the US Embassy and his military colleagues remarked to Lieutenant Colonel David Evans III, the US assistant air attaché, that "they wanted to join a US-led military command and acquire new weapons and training" and "promised to escalate their campaign against Egyptian communists" (Sirrs 2010, p. 26). The external actor may influence the success of the coup, especially if we take into account the fact that 'success' here does not end when a military takes over power in a few hours and sends into exile or prison 'pariah' politicians or presidents. As Thyne et al. pointed out, "far from being the end of political turmoil, the putschists' rise to power could merely represent the beginning of a much longer political crisis" (2017, p. 4). If popular support is absent, international support is late, and the coup action stalls or appears close to stumbling, military cohesion may be affected, which may directly influence coup outcome and derail it. After all, the degree of cohesion within military during coups d'état is directly influenced by perceptions of domestic and international support (Barracca 2007, p. 139). External actors matter after the coup also because a horrible example may be made of coups and putschists by domestic and external actors if the new military rulers or the junta fails to *govern*. External support is at least one of the factors that may sustain 'political influence' of militaries that frequently intervene in political processes and eventually cause or sustain 'bad' civil-military relations.

A military government, regardless of how long, needs to *deliver* goods and services to the people. In other words, if it is to be successful, a military coup must survive beyond the initial capture of key places such as the presidential palace, the parliament, the radio station, etc. There are various factors that can render an initially successful coup unsuccessful and unsustainable after a few hours or days. As argued before, internal resistance by different actors ranging from bureaucracy to trade unions may cause huge problems for the putschists (Sundhaussen 1998, pp. 330–331). Yet, it is not only domestic inhibitors in the form of a popular resistance—which is what coup wannabes fear the most, as stated before—that can cause the failure of a coup attempt. International factors and actors with strong linkages and leverages can also make life very hard for the coupists. In countries such as Turkey and Pakistan, where the economy was often in shambles under the periods studied in this book and which developed a serious dependency on US arms, external support (economic aid, erasing or rescheduling debt and military aid) often provides a vital lifeline for the new military rulers regardless of how long these military regimes lasted (they lasted far longer in Pakistan than in Turkey).

> The threat of international retaliation, once a coup has been launched, is likely to have an important impact on its success or failure. Indeed, an important reason cited for the decrease in the number of successful military coups in the developing world over the past quarter century is greater pressure from the West on countries to democratize and stay democratic. However, the willingness of the USA, the EU and Western-led multilateral institutions to use this pressure, as well as the capacity to use it effectively, varies from case to case and from region to region. In terms of capacity, the effectiveness of foreign pressure varies depending upon the degree to which a country is linked to the West. These linkages take many forms, including cultural ties, economic integration, military and political alliances and penetration by international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). As a general rule, the greater the linkages a country has to the West, the greater leverage or influence the West has over that country. (Barracca 2007, p. 141)

US leverage would conceivably work best in cases where the USA entertains close ties and various leverages with the country in question. As Thyne pointed out, "signals should have the largest impact as states become heavily dependent upon US assistance… aid provides the USA with long-term leverage over other states" (Thyne 2010, p. 459). Throughout the majority of the Cold War, the USA maintained excellent ties with Turkey and fairly good linkages with Pakistan. This is all the more true in the case of Turkey if 'linkage' is defined as "the density of ties and cross-border flows between a particular country and the US, the EU, and western-dominated multilateral institutions" comprising of five components: 'Economic linkage', which covers subjects such as trade, investment, credit, and bilateral and multilateral aid flows; 'geopolitical linkage', which includes connections with western governments and membership in western-led alliances, treaties, and international organizations; 'Social linkage' through migration, tourism, refugees, and diaspora communities, as well as elite education in the West. 'Communication linkage' or the flow of information; 'Transnational civil society linkage', which covers linkages between local religious groups and NGOs includes and their western counterparts (Levitsky and Way 2006, pp. 383–384).

As argued by Lt. General Asad Durrani, a former Director of Inter-Services Intelligence of Pakistan, US aid has always had a large defense component which has largely been in the area of hardware, rather than being geared toward building local Pakistani production and infrastructure. This rendered Pakistan dependent on the USA. "The Pakistani

military would get addicted to high-tech equipment, will remain reliant on the US' supply line and will therefore obstruct any effort to change the nature of relationship…" (Durrani 2007, p. 52). This supports the argument that Pakistan's dependency on US economic and military assistance during the Cold War would have forced it to care more for US reaction to a coup.

Indicators of Support or Rejection

Once the coup action is over, and if it has been successful, the types of support an external actor may give or withdraw may range from how the external actor names the event and whether it recognizes the new government to diplomatic, military, and economic assistance, which help sustain the new rulers and the regime.

> Country leaders can try to isolate themselves from foreign pressure by relying on small groups of loyal supporters, but coup entrepreneurs have to contend with an especially precarious domestic situation. Foreign support may co-ordinate expectations among wavering backers and cause them to fall in line, whereas foreign condemnation may undermine domestic confidence in the regime's ability to deliver indispensable outside resources. (Marinov and Goemans 2014, p. 805)

In one such historical instance of a coup d'état, there were several things the USA could do to show opposition to what happened: (a) nonacceptance; (b) withholding military aid; (c) diplomatic action such as recall of ambassador, condemnation of UN and/or NATO, and statement by a high-level administration official condemning the coup was also possible (Keeley 2010, p. 109). To begin with, naming as well as leaving an event unnamed can be a very political act. In fact, as is the case with coups d'état, naming can be a major political issue. In particular, how to name an event mattered tremendously for the United States as well on the grounds that Section 508 of Foreign Assistance Act passed in 1961 stipulated that the USA must stop giving aid to countries where "a "duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup." How the USA and other powerful external actors named an event matter tremendously for the coup makers. Naming affects recognition of new military governments in power after a coup takes places. Receiving recognition from international community also matter for putschists. As Rowell pointed

out, "in those days [during the Cold War] we [the US] regarded every recognition of a new government as a kind of blessing, and we let the public know that it was a kind of blessing. That stretched out the period of awkward communications excessively" (Rowell 2016, p. 48; brackets added).

For instance, in the most recent Egyptian coup in 2013, the United States has carefully avoided calling what happened in Egypt on July 3 a 'coup d'état'; the Secretary of State John Kerry did not even accept calling the event *military take-over*: "the military did not take over, to the best of our judgment—so far. To run the country, there's a civilian government. In effect, they were restoring democracy" (Siddique 2013).[6] This can easily be contrasted with Secretary Kerry's reaction to the 2014 coup in Thailand against pro-Western government of Yingluck Shinawatra: "… there is no justification for this military coup… I urge the restoration of civilian government immediately, a return to democracy, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as press freedoms" (US Embassy in the Philippines 2014). As far as Turkish politics and public perception is concerned, using 'military takeover', 'revolution' and 'military intervention' instead of using 'coup' may come to mean condoning the military's foray into politics. 'Coup d'état' on the other hand carries negative connotations; it is immediately identified with negation of democracy.

Here it may be said that the United States applied four major criteria into its recognition policy after a coup d'état: US administrations first considered whether the coup was bloodless, which also implied if there was—and may still be—civil resistance to the coup action. If the coup caused blood to be spilt on the streets, this shows that there were clashes and, therefore, implies some risk of resistance. For instance, when the USA advised the military and government against implementing Menderes' capital punishment after the coup, it said, the Turkish Army made a beautiful move on May 27, 1960 and executed a bloodless coup and there was absolutely no reason to blemish it with this execution (Karavelioğlu 2016, p. 150). This is how the US Embassy initially approached the colonels' coup in Greece in 1967 (Keeley 2010, p. 102) and Ben Ali's coup in Tunisia in 1987.

[6] Similarly, Secretary of State John Kerry's predecessor Hillary Clinton shunned naming army's overthrow of leftist government in Honduras in 2009 'coup d'état (Ross 2009).

The second factor, not unrelated to the first, was whether the new authority was in full control of the domestic situation. If it lacked such control, the entire effort may have fallen prey to communist subversive activities and leave country defenseless against communism. Hence, the Department of State gave the following instructions in assessing whether or not the USA should support military coups d'état and pursuant regimes early in the Cold War: "the essential test from our point of view should be whether a particular military regime responsibly confronts the problems facing it—security and developmental progress—and, in so doing, successfully resists Communist techniques." According to the State Department, coups d'état in Burma, Pakistan and the Sudan in the 1950s met this requirement. The US Ambassador to Thailand added his host country to that list too ("Dispatch From the Embassy in Thailand" 1959).

The third interrelated factor taken into account was whether or not the coup makers were known to the US Embassy. The chances that an US Embassy would not have any biographic intelligence on the coup makers was high only if the coup was staged by the lower ranks, something which also increased the possibility of resistance to a coup. This is why Keeley said of the feeling of the US Embassy when the colonels took over in Greece that "had the [Colonel's] coup [in Greece] been engineered by the senior generals of the Spantidakis group, our intelligence situation would have been quite good: we had a lot of data on those officers, we knew their orientation thoroughly (basically rightist, royalist, and pro-American), and the leading personalities were well known to our own senior officers of JUSMAGG and the attaché office, who had worked with them intimately for years" (Keeley 2010, p. 90).

The last, but definitely not least, important criterion was whether or not the new government was ready to 'honor international obligations'. John Foster Dulles, the US Secretary of State (1953–1959), had said during domestic discussions around the issue of recognition, stated this criterion in a real event of US-induced coup d'état in Guetamala. Dulles said that "…we want to feel satisfied that the new regime will be able to and willing to carry out its international obligations. If we are satisfied on that point… we should proceed to recognition" (Dulles quoted in Lafore 1956, p. 155). The United States recognized the coup in Libya in 1969, with a US official paraphrasing the official State Department statement on the issue in clearer terms: "revolutionary council was 'in firm control of the country' and had promised 'to honor international

obligations…'" (Wadlow 1978, p. 22). Secretary of State Christian Herter summed up some of these criteria: "whether the government exercises effective control of the machinery of government; whether it is without substantial resistance; and whether it is willing to comply with international obligations, including not only treaty commitments but also other international obligations" (Wadlow 1978, p. 23). Political orientation of the government and its leaders was no doubt important as well (Wadlow 1978, p. 25) "…for cases outside the Western Hemisphere, the trend is to omit issuing official and formal recognition statements and to say the question of recognition did not arise…" (Wadlow 1978, p. 21). However, it is not so important how the United States thinks about 'recognition' or how it approaches the issue is not too important. What mattered more was the fact that "when the United States eventually did extend recognition to a new government that it was a sign of American approval" (Wadlow, p. 21).

Military, Political, and Economic Assistance

The second instrument of support that is available to the United States to influence the fate of the coup is the crucial military and economic assistance. Military and economic assistance matters because it may create military, political, social, and cultural outcomes in both the short and long term (Gürdeniz 2013, p. 100). Economic aid may make significant impact on domestic political outcomes even during periods of stability. Economic and military assistance may help civilian governments survive longer than they otherwise could (Harris cited in Holmes 2014, p. 51). Thus, whether before or after a coup arms donors do not dole out military assistance without expecting any return, which may be in the form of granting use of harbors, bases, different facilities, and some other rights (Venkataramani 1984, pp. 416–417; Syed 1970, pp. 15–16; Huntington 1970, p. 9; also Abramowitz 2009, p. 94; Brown 2005, p. 181).

In its early years receiving external economic and military aid may even be a matter of survival for a military government. "Outside forces may be unable to intervene quickly enough to forestall a rapid power grab, but foreign donors have ample time to influence the direction of new and vulnerable regimes" (Marinov and Goemans 2014, p. 800). In a review of the role US Embassy assistance played in Pakistan after its independence, the US Embassy in Karachi thought that "Pakistan could

hardly have survived its early years as an independent country if it had not been for substantial US Embassy aid programs. It is, in fact, a measure of the success of those programs that despite tremendous difficulties the nation has been sustained and has maintained, indeed greatly strengthened, its orientation toward the Free World" ("Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan" 1959, September 23).

Because the primary subject of a coup is armed forces, military assistance may also carry "political symbolism" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 57; Cohen 1976, p. 55). Military assistance may also help military chiefs regardless of the coup situation. Modernized arms may imply to members of armed forces that their institution, which they see as indispensable to their country and nation's future, is taken good care of. As O'Connell and Diehl pointed out for the effect of transfer of U.S. Embassy arms to Jordanian military, "modern [military] equipment helped keep morale and loyalty high" (pp. 37, 77; see also Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. 89).

The significance attached by the armed forces themselves to US military and economic aid maybe illustrated with an example from Pakistan. The Yahya Khan regime, which took over the government from Ayub Khan in 1969, was desperate for military and economic aid from the USA. The deputy martial law administrator and commander of the navy, Vice-Admiral Syed Muhammad Ahsan, who represented Pakistan at President Eisenhower's funeral in April 1969, deemed the occasion propitious enough to make a case for US assistance to the new military government. He told the State Department officials that "Pakistan could not afford "expensive purchases in Western Europe… going on to argue that this was a psychologically important time for the United States to invest in Pakistan's new leaders, who needed weapons for internal security and to "keep their troops from becoming disgruntled" (Haqqani 2013, pp. 128–129). This shows how important foreign aid becomes for newly-minted rulers. In a way, US assistance became one of the most credible ways for a ruler to claim that he is in charge and control, about which US officials were fully aware (Haqqani 2013, p. 129). In return, General-turned-President Yahya promised visiting Secretary of State William Rogers that Pakistan was fully loyal to its commitments through SEATO, CENTO, and alliance with the USA[7] (Haqqani 2013,

[7]When Nixon administration later extended assistance to Yahya Khan despite Pakistani atrocities in then East Pakistan, at the expense of violating the US sanctions previously imposed, the reason was partly because both Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and

pp. 129–130). According to Venkatarami (1984), in light of the power struggle among the political and military elite in Pakistan between 1955–1958, the US Embassy military aid had greatly enhanced his [Ayub's] image within the armed forces (p. 341).

When delivered after a coup, "arms transfers obviously carry with them important symbolic and overt messages of support" (Cohen 1976, p. 55; Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 58). "If one considers foreign aid as a tool to convey international acceptance or censure, then the case of Pakistan is instructive. Thus, out of the 12.6 billion US dollars' worth of military and economic assistance provided to the country between 1954 and 2002, $9.19 billion were given during twenty-four years of military rule while only $3.4 billion were provided to civiilan regimes covering nineteen years" (Aziz 2008, p. 30). This can be attributed to the importance the Pakistani military as the strongest political force in the country for the United States. As argued in an Embassy telegram from Islamabad, "despite frequently heard criticism of United States military assistance to Pakistan, the existence in this country of an efficient military force is an asset which should not be minimized" ("Airgram From the Embassy in Pakistan" 1959, September 23). To cite yet another example, following the overthrow of Liberian President William Tolbert by General Samuel K. Doe in April 1980, the US Embassy increased military and economic aid to the new military regime. The total Official Development Assistance (ODA) to Liberia increased from $26 million in 1979 to $137 million (USD 2011) in 1981 in the expectation of closer policy cooperation between the two countries (Sesay cited in Masaki 2016, p. 54).

The allocation of professional military education budgets after military interventions may also send certain signals to foreign governments. According to a Senate Committee Report in 2001, participation in IMET programs sends a signal to foreign governments: "… rightly or wrongly, many perceive IMET participation as bestowing a degree of legitimacy from the United States on the actions of the foreign militaries

President Nixon enjoyed Yahya Khan's friendship as opposed to their dislike of Indians. In return for the vital assistance of the US administration despite protestations of the State Department, General Yahya Khan was grateful and promised to never do anything to embarrass the United States (Bass 2013, pp. xii–xix, 13).

and governments" (Leahy 2002). US military aid seems to have carried this symbolic importance across the Pakistani political spectrum. According to Siddiqa-Agha, "weapons transfers or any military cooperation with Washington is held as American support for the ruling party in Islamabad… both military and democratically elected regimes have looked outside for support" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, pp. 57–58). Lefever appears justified in arguing therefore that "the immediate result [of military aid] is to help strengthen the current government, whether it is civilian or military, effective or ineffective, authoritarian or democratic, relatively corrupt or relatively honest. Such aid also tends or reinforce the existing political system… the program tends to reinforce the status quo…" (Lefever 1980, p. 283).

When a significant amount of aid is delivered to the military as a priority client for the foreign donor, this may directly affect the "distribution of political capabilities" among various groups in a society where money and training opportunities are insufficient, and therefore promote the role of the military (Rowe 1974, pp. 241–242; Shah 2011, p. 17; see also Aziz, p. 7). As Ahmad said in the case of Pakistan, "US economic and military assistance has helped the Pakistani security apparatus to expand its capabilities at the expense of its domestic counterparts" (2005, p. 148; see also Cohen 2010, p. 143; Cohen 1976, pp. 53–54). One reason why military aid may strengthen the political position of armed forces overall (Nawaz 2008, p. 200) may be that arms relations foster closer dialogue between officers of two defense establishments (Fakir Syed Aijazuddin, personal communication, September 29, 2015). According to Venkataramani, even if arms relations are started by civilian officials, arms donors may want to anchorite the arms relationship to a more permanent actor in the system, especially in countries where the armies are powerful domestic political actors (pp. 418–419). Bilateral relations formed over military aid foster furthered dialogue and contacts between the US Embassy and Pakistani officers, thereby giving Washington the chance to shape the thinking and tendencies of Pakistan's armed forces (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, p. 58).

The total suspension of economic and military assistance or partial aid penalties too may serve the same function of extracting policy concessions from the target country and preserving US. interests in general terms as extending economic and military assistance. Admittedly, the United States' ability to impose sanctions was circumscribed under the conditions dictated by the Cold War because "withholding aid from

autocratic countries could mean losing clients to" the Soviets (Dunning quoted in Masaki 2016, p. 54). For instance, when King Hussein in Jordan desired more US arms and assistance in the early 1960s but the Kennedy Administration demurred because of lack of support in the Congress, the CIA presented the choice to Phil Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for the Middle East, as between 'rearming Jordan' or leaving the Kingdom to "…Soviet arms–and influence" (O'Connell and Loeb 2001, p. 38). Or, terminating existing aid programs may come to mean in some cases completely wasting what had been accomplished (Syed 1970, p. 16).

However, this should not lead us to discount the weight that penalties on previously committed military and economic aid could carry for the coup makers. For even under the Cold War rivalry, the US administrations were able to enforce sanctions and use various penalties after military coups several times.[8] "Any conspicuous sanction such as the cutting off of aid, can serve to distance the United States from a regime engaged in violation of human rights, and to withdraw from such a regime the possibility of arguing that its policy and acts meet no meaningful objection, have no costly consequences, or are condoned in fact by major democratic states" (Lewis 1980, pp. 197, 198).

Finally, when military officers stage a coup, it makes sense that they will want to be *recognized* as legitimate by external actors as quickly as possible. This may start with recognition, but goes further to include high-level visits by senior officials from powerful external actors and receiving invitations to speak in international forums and platforms. Therefore, 'political support' also needs to be considered in order to understand how the USA approached a coup in its aftermath. Recognition of a new government after a coup may itself be a signal to deter counter-coup attempts. Because those who plan to initiate a counter-coup then know that even if they succeeded, they could face fierce external resistance after the coup (Thyne 2010, p. 452). High-level visits

[8] For the US reaction to the coup in Honduras in 1963 see Rowell 2016, p. 36; for the US reaction to overthrow by Peruvian army of US-favored Fernando Belaunde Terry, see Flanigan 2000, pp. 5–6; When the CIA reported in late April 1963 that a pro-Nasser coup was in the offing in Jordan, US President Kennedy ordered the 6th Fleet to position in the eastern Mediterranean to be ready for action any time, see Little 1995, p. 530.

by generals and other high-status people, and close relations between U.S. officers and ambassadors also signal support (Keeley 2010, p. 198; see also Satloff 2000).[9]

'In highly personal cultures such as that of Turkey high-level visits such as by US Embassy presidents are seen reassuring signs of US support (Makovsky in Abramowitz 2000, pp. 219–266). This is why Prime Minister Menderes insisted on a visit by President Eisenhower to Turkey in 1959 and said that "Your [President Eisenhower's] visit to the CENTO countries would equal sending three American divisions" ("Memorandum of Conversation", 1959, October 9). Visits carried symbolic, but important meaning that it would be a problem for a country's highest officials such as Pakistan to fail to honor an invitation by the Soviets and rather accept the US Embassy invitation to visit Washington. As Ayub Khan said, "the big powers feel very insulted by such behavior, and they never forget or forgive" (Ghani 2010, p. 5). The Pakistani officials attached great importance to high-level visits by US Embassy officials. They took these visits as 'index of American commitment' and 'communiqués issued after these visits' as "signaling U.S. policy not only to Pakistan but also to India and the Soviet Union" (Tahir-Kheli 1982, p. xv).

Due to this symbolic, but empowering effect of high-level visits (both from and to) that Bhutto sought a face-to-face meeting in Washington with President Carter in the middle of raging protests against his rule in 1977. However, Pakistan's Ambassador to the USA, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, predicted that the USA would decline. Ambassador Yaqub thought that "if the American purpose was to engineer Bhutto's exit, then they were hardly likely to provide him with the public relations boost and political support of an invitation from the President" (Akhund 1997, p. 323). The meeting did not actually take place.

The point here, however, is not only that the USA decline to invite PM Bhutto at such a critical time shows US displeasure with Bhutto,

[9]The Afghan Ambassador to Washington, Karim Khalili (1978–1980), said in a meeting with U.S. Ambassador to Kabul on December 1977 that the US invitation to President Daoud was very important for Afghanistan and "Afghanistan receives economic assistance from the USA which is welcome but US moral and political support is of paramount importance to the people of Afghanistan, to president Daoud himself and to the Republican government." See "Afghan Ambassador Karim's Meeting", 1977.

but also that these visits carry additional meaning for the visitors to the US capital and imply support by the United States. When mid-ranking officers staged an unexpected coup in Greece in 1967 and the USA did little to condemn it, some ordinary Greeks pointed at the number of high-level visitors to Greece, including the Vice-President from 1969 to 1973 under the Nixon Administration, Spiro Agnew, who was of Greek-American descent (McCaskill 1998). On another occasion, President Nixon went on an Asia tour, starting on July 23, 1969 and the tour also included a stopover in Pakistan. According to Haqqani, "for Yahya, however, Nixon's arrival in Pakistan amounted to receiving the American stamp of approval. He needed it in order to reassure key Pakistani constituencies—especially the army—that the United States would continue paying some of the country's bills even after Ayub was gone" (Haqqani, pp. 130–131).

The conditions President Bill Clinton set for his short Pakistan trip in 2000 show that top policy aides and bureaucrats are themselves aware of the possible effects of a high-level visit to a place where a coup has just taken place. For example, some of his top policy aides warned President Clinton skip Pakistan in his upcoming tour of South Asia in mid-March 2000 because (in addition to other reasons) "United States should not be the first country to give a coup-plotter and military dictator the political boost of a high-level visit" (Talbott 2004, p. 191). When the burden of the army-dominant regime in Algeria could no longer be shouldered due to its civilian massacres from its coup to 1997, "one concrete result was that Western officials, worried about attracting notice for appearing publicly with Algerian military officials, stopped making official visits" (Martinez 2004, p. 16).

Military-to-Military

Analyses of 'civil-military relations' tend to focus lopsidedly on civilian-to-civilian interactions in domestic settings. Civilian-to-military and military-to-military relationships between respective armed forces and defense officials are sorely neglected. Those who do not neglect the issue fail to discuss its content and form and how and what it may help understand better (Karasapan 1989). It is one of the prime objectives of this study to show the significance of the bilateral relationship on the military plane and the instruments, platforms and mechanisms involved in it.

A recent example has shown clearly how bilateral military connections away from civilian oversight can help armed actors undermine official government policy (Hersh 2016). These channels are important to understand to make sense of external assistance for coups because the military-to-military relationship can be key to elicit understanding and assistance after coups d'état. Given the facts that militaries in Latin America, Africa and Middle East were most powerful actors in their domestic set-ups and coups d'état were primarily led by armed forces during the Cold war, we must consider the relationships between US and foreign militaries and defense establishments as complementary to civilian-to-civilian contacts and relationships (Lefever 1980, p. 277; Edip Başer, personal communication, October 31, 2015.).

In countries where militaries played visibly decisive role in politics, even US embassies were structured accordingly. In such 'high-military influence' places, the US embassies deliberately hosted the position of 'Political/Military Counselor.' Even after the Cold War ended, "the Embassy in Ankara was one of the few that still retained a separate political-military section. And that obviously speaks to the importance of the military relationship, military element in the bilateral relationship" (McKee 2016, pp. 63–64). It may be a good idea here to complement the civilian-to-military relationship with the military-to-military relationship for two particular reasons. To begin with, the Pentagon stood out as a very relevant actor in dealing with other armed forces, including that of Turkey and Pakistan. While the civilian high-level US officials may have at times wavered on the strategic importance of Turkey and Pakistan in the global effort to contain the Soviets early in the Cold War period, American defense establishment did not (Ali Sarwar Naqvi, personal communication, October 5, 2015; Arif Ayub, personal communication; Zafar Iqbal Cheema, personal communication October 1, 2015; Bashir Ahmad, personal communication). "Turkey was important to the US in military/security terms because it controlled the Soviets and it had a border with the then Soviet Union. This perception of Turkey was created in large part because of the influence of the U.S. military" (McCaskill 1998, p. 30).

Military generals did not only influence the policy from the sidelines. In the 1950s and late 1970s, US military officers/generals assumed positions of power within US administrations. When they did so, they brought with them their earlier connections and networks in other

countries. Their previous acquaintance with and view of generals in Turkey and Pakistan colored their later perspective and, therefore, had an influence on US policy toward these places. For instance, General Eisenhower, the Supreme Commander of NATO forces in 1951, himself became President in 1953. Besides, Henry Byroade, who had "first-hand experience in South Asia, having spent part of the war building airfield in eastern India" became the regional assistant [South Asia] to the Secretary of State in late 1951 (Kux 2001, p. 47). His appointment as the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East-South Asia-Africa in December 1951 became the crucial facilitator in building US—Pakistani connection. "Byroade's appointment to the State Department facilitated discussion between the higher echelon of civil and military bureaucracies in Pakistan and the Pentagon" (Gardezi and Rashid 1983, pp. 102–103). Henry Byroade later became Ambassador to Pakistan in 1973. When President Nixon appointed Byroade as Ambassador to Islamabad in 1973, he gave the impression that he had handpicked him specifically because he was a former soldier. President Nixon said to PM Bhutto in the White House that "You can talk to Ambassador Byroade. He is a tough, no-nonsense fellow. He is not pro-Indian. He knows the Middle East, and he is totally the President's man. You will have an ambassador who knows what our policy is… He is a military man. He was a Brigadier General" ("Memorandum of Conversation" 1973, September 19).

Admiral Stansfield Turner, NATO Commander in Chief, Allied Forces Southern Europe, later became the CIA Chief (from 1977 to 1981). The Commander of the Turkish 2nd Army, İbrahim Şenocak, felt close and assertive enough to ask Admiral Turner during his visit to Turkey in 1975 to try to influence US politicians and persuade them to stop pressuring Turkey and remove the sanctions (Şenocak 2005, p. 135). Alexander Haig, the Supreme Commander of NATO from 1974 to 1979, also became the Secretary of State under the Reagan Administration in early 1981. His becoming the Secretary of State worked out for the best for the September 12 coup in Turkey. In the words of İlter Türkmen, a former diplomat who also became Turkey's FM after that coup, "We had very good relations with the U.S. after the September 12 coup. One reason behind this was Haig as the Secretary of State. Haig knew Ankara very well. He stayed in Ankara when he was a young officer and he was a very good friend of General Evren. Haig told us that the Europeans were giving arrogant reactions to the coup by preaching about democracy but the U.S. administration will not do that.

They truly did not" (personal communication, November 16, 2015). The military-to-military contacts established between respective generals earlier were therefore carried over to later periods when military officers took up civilian positions of power within respective Administrations.

The second reason why we need to take into consideration the military-to-military relationship is related to the ease with which soldiers communicate with one other. The rapport established between military officers through prior encounters results in more trust and provides a more stable channel for future interactions. Inter-officer friendships forged during joint military education and training and other opportunities or platforms such as joint operations or drills facilitate cooperation (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011, p. 66). As retired Pakistani officer Tughral Yamin told the author of the 1950s and 1960s,

> CENTCOM has always been a very good friend of Pakistani army. Pakistani generals felt very close to CENTCOM [India was in PACOM, Pakistan was in CENTCOM]. The American generals used to come for hunting to Pakistan. Officers find it easier to communicate with each other because they think that generals talk straight and get straight reply. They think they cannot get a straight reply from a politician. For the politician can say one thing one day and change his idea the next day. Generals are more straightforward with each other. In the army, you have very clear lines distinguishing enemy and friendly forces. There is nothing in between. With politicians, you have many shades and gray areas. There is no gray area in the army's playbook. (Tughral Yamin, personal communication, October 10, 2015; Khalid Iqbal, personal communication, November 16, 2015)

Lt. General Asad Durrani, the former Director General of the ISI, said that he does not believe that the USA or its military encouraged, either directly or indirectly, the Pakistan Army to depose a government and assume power. However, when the Army did take over, "its special rapport with the US defense establishment proved helpful". His perception and past experience was that the US did raise concerns about democracy after military coups d'état in Pakistan but always maintained "a policy of engagement" with Pakistan's military governments. He thought the hegemonic powers such as the US enjoyed working with military rulers free from constraints put by parliament or pressure by public opinion (Durrani 2007, pp. 51–52). Military-to-military contacts also worked for gathering information through private channels. It was thanks to such

military-to-military contacts that the United States obtained advanced knowledge that General Evren would succeed General Semih Sancar as the next Chief of General Staff in early March 1978. General Sancar himself told a "CENTO military source" that he would retire on March 6 and that Evren would succeed him ("General Sancar to Retire" 1978, February 27).

The armed forces were the most significant political actors in Turkey and Pakistan during the Cold War. As the retired Pakistani Commander Farooq Lodhi pointed out, "most of the time during the Cold War we, as military officers, did not learn to submit to the civilians. If I was going to receive some ships from the United States, I did not ask parliamentary officials or Defense Ministry people to go to the States, take the ships and give it to my captain there to bring it back. What we did is that we took it upon ourselves, we never let civilians come near us" (Farooq Lodhi, personal communication, October 1, 2015). Since militaries were the most powerful actors, US administrations saw them as the ones who could easily—and speedily—deliver the outcomes most desired by the United States. As Pickering remarked in hindsight, the United States "had a tendency to look at Pakistan as the army state over and that the military would provide what we [the U.S.] needed" (Pickering 2015, p. 519). A US National Security Council Report described Pakistan military in the mid-1950s as "…potentially the most stable and actively the most cooperative element in Pakistan society" ("Statement of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward South Asia", 1957, January 10). When Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott (1994–2001) and his entourage tried to reach the Pakistani foreign ministry and prime minister's office for talks but was turned down on another occasion, General Anthony Zinni, an American Marine four-star general and Commander-in-Chief of US Central Command (1997–2000), called Pakistan Chief of Army Jehangir Karamat and reached him right away to clear up obstacles in front of American high-level visit (Talbott 2004, p. 59).

For this reason, it made sense to deal primarily with the soldiers and treat formal civilian interactions only secondary and ceremonial. For instance, after US reconnaissance plane RB-57 crashed in the Black Sea in 1965, NATO SACEUR came to Turkey and appealed to the Chief of Turkish General Staff to apply necessary pressure on the civilian government to resume these flights. He did so because "Americans, similar to many foreign officials in Ankara, used to see the General Staff as above

and more powerful than the civilian authority" (Orkunt 1978, p. 380). The Soviets had the same impression about the balance of powers among domestic political actors in Turkey (Orkunt 1978, p. 384).

The next useful benefit the USA saw in having politically powerful militaries as a safety valve in other countries was that the latter seemed far more conservative and resolute than other domestic actors to fight communism or nip an unwanted event in the bud (Wolpin 1972, p. 13; Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). For instance, the military in Shah's Iran, the Jordanian army, the army in Thailand (Weiner 2008, pp. 149–150, 148th note on p. 579), Ecuador (Fitch 2005, p. 40), and militaries in Turkey and Pakistan were considered as bastions of anti-communism, and, therefore, were considered as guarantors of the pro-Western position and general stability (Goodpaster cited in Barrett 2007, chap. 8, note 71, p. 400; O'Connell and Loeb 2001, pp. 37, 77; Valley 1983, p. 22; see also Grigoriadis 2009, p. 75; Lenczowski 1979).

General Woods, director of US military assistance in 1965, said during a Congressional Hearing on Foreign Operations Appropriations that the void that exists in the running of Brazil can only be filled by the military, "the only force for stability and orderliness" (cited in Wolpin 1972, p. 50). Even before becoming Prime Minister and President, Bhutto had thought that it was wrong for Pakistan to rely solely on the US with total disregard toward the Soviet Union. He wanted to diversify options available to Pakistan. However, this alarmed the military establishment because "… hob-nobbing with 'godless Communism' was a bad thing in itself and would put ideas in the heads of the lower classes" (Akhund 1997, pp. 295–297). Militaries in Latin America were also more anti-communist than any other group, so much so that "without the armed forces, but with all other things being equal, every republic in Spanish America except Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Cuba would stand politically to the left of where it is now" (Johnson, 1964, p. 144). The main reason why the USA assented to the tossing aside of President Naguib in Egypt, who had also been the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council formed after Free Officers' coup in 1952, and see Nasser take his place was that the USA saw him as soft on communism whereas Nasser demonstrated his resolve to suppress communists in putting down a strike in Kafr al-Dawar (Kandil 2014, p. 26).

Cultivating Other Militaries

The United States was very much aware of the importance of cultivating good connections to politically powerful militaries during the Cold War. The State Department forwarded to forty-two Embassy posts some material related to the role of the military in less developed countries and requested their assessment from each post by October 1, 1959. The State Department assumed that "authoritarianism will remain the norm in Free Asia for a long period", which 'forced' US administrations to work with authoritarian governments in less developed countries. The Department of State material also included enclosed documents, one of which was entitled "Political Implications of Afro-Asian Military Takeovers". The US Ambassador to Thailand commented in response to State Department that 'Thailand too was not ready for genuine democratic form of government. This was why the USA found it reasonable to work with the then existing authoritarian government that Marshall Sarit took over in a coup d'état in 1958. "The generally conservative nature of Thai military and governmental leaders and long-established institutions (monarchy, Buddhism) furnish a strong barrier against the spread of Communist influence" ("Dispatch From the Embassy in Thailand" 1959).

With the awareness that militaries in several countries were the key political actors on the domestic scene US ambassadors stationed in Ankara and Rawalpindi (later Islamabad as the new capital) paid special attention to cultivate relationship with these militaries. For instance, the US Ambassador to Turkey, Ronald Spiers (1977–1980), said,

> I became good friends with the Turkish military. I left Turkey as a minor hero among the military. The Chief of Staff later became President, so that my contacts were very useful. I sought them out and cultivated them carefully… I did that in Turkey, Great Britain and Pakistan. I had worked with the American military a lot, I liked them and so I gravitated to those connections. In Turkey and Pakistan, of course, they were very important in the political arena. The President of Turkey was a former admiral. I suspect that my predecessors had not made the same approaches as I did. I think the Turkish military appreciated my efforts. The week I left, the four Chiefs of Staff—Army, Navy, Air Force and Gendarmerie—gave a dinner for me which I was told was unprecedented. It was noted as such in the Turkish newspapers. One of these officers was Kenan Evren, whom I saw again when I was in Pakistan, by which time he had become President

> of Turkey. As is customary, all Ambassadors go to the airport to meet an arriving Chief of State. When he got to me, he showed great surprise and threw his arms around me. President Zia looked at me with new respect. (Spiers 1998, 76)

Militaries became crucial points of contact for the United States' relations with other countries that were ruled directly or governed from behind the scenes by their political militaries. U.S.' relationships with Pakistan, pre-1979 Iran, and Turkey provide a nice testimony.[10] The US Ambassador to Pakistan Robert B. Oakley (1988–1991) naturally tried to cultivate a good relationship with the Pakistani military:

> Right from the beginning of my tour, one of the techniques I used to improve US-Pakistan relations—in part by reassuring the Pakistanis that their nascent democratic political process could continue without concern of outside interference—was to increase military-to-military cooperation. We accelerated the delivery of end items that were in the pipeline—like self-propelled howitzers, helicopters, naval vessels, etc. Under normal procurement practices, much of this equipment might have taken as much as three years for delivery. We managed to get it delivered immediately. Our Chiefs of Staff of the Army and the Air Force paid extended visits to Pakistan in 1989. The Pakistani Navy Chief of Staff spent a prolonged period in the US General [John J.] Yeosock, who later commanded US ground troops in Desert Storm, came to observe Pakistani military exercises and gave some advice. More Pakistani officers went to the US for training. So we worked very hard to establish a close military-to-military relationship and I think it was a very successful program. Prior to this time, the close relationship had only existed between the Air Forces; by the late 1980s, we had done the same thing for the Armies and the Navies. That program became one of the serious negative consequences of Pressler; it had to be completely halted on 10/1/90 when the President could no

[10] Retired Major General Ahmet Bertan Nogaylaroğlu describes the relationship between the US and Turkish, Pakistani and Egyptian militaries as that of 'old friends' [kadim dostlar] and asks why the USA threw aside the Turkish Armed Forces, which it had long seen as the safety valve for the western world. Nogaylaroğlu (2015, p. 272); On the General Headquarters of Pakistani Military being "a port of call for the decision makers and even some foreign dignitaries visiting the country", see Arif in Malik (Ed.) 2001, p. 101; From the US perspective, the military held key importance in the system not only in Turkey but also in Iran, see Haig (1992, pp. 537–538).

> longer certify that Pakistan did not have a nuclear device or components. (Oakley 1999, pp. 146–147; added brackets)

Bruce Riedel, a former US intelligence officer and a senior advisor to four US presidents on South Asia, pointed out, "when dealing with Pakistan, Washington has always been tempted to first seek out the chief of army staff (COAS) for a rapid decision", which had the (intentional or unwitting) effect of circumventing elected civilian officials and thus weakening their hand in politics vis-à-vis the army (Riedel 2011, p. 128).

US high-level officials visiting Pakistan made a habit of stopping in Rawalpindi, the initial capital and where the Pakistan military headquarters had been located, and met the Chief of Army Staff there, hoping that if they agreed with the generals, this would be enough to get Pakistani cooperation (Talbott 2004, pp. 58, 110). Several US administrations chose to work closely with the Pakistani military because the military has been in firm control of Pakistan external and security policy and it can deliver what and when they promise. "US administrations prefer to deal with a Pakistani military establishment that is used to giving and having its orders obeyed. Because the United States has worked closely with successive generations of Pakistani military officers, familiar friends are also preferable to unknown civilian partners" (Ahmad 2005, p. 156; see also Shah 2014, pp. 281, 282; Venkataramani, pp. 273–274; Zafar Jaspal, personal communication, October 2, 2015; Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema, personal communication, October 1, 2015).

The interest in the military-to-military and military-to-civilian relationship in Turkish—US and Pakistani—US relations was mutual, as was elsewhere during the Cold War. For instance, in the case of the Free Officers' coup on July 23 (1952) in Egypt, the coupists knew how important American support was and selected their air force intelligence chief Aly Sabri as their envoy for contacting the US Embassy. According to Sirrs, "Sabri was a logical choice: not only had he attended an air force intelligence officers' course in Colorado, he also was on excellent terms with the US assistant air attaché, Lieutenant Colonel David Evans III" (Sirrs 2010, p. 25). In both Turkey and Pakistan, army generals were also aware in return that keeping a direct channel to the United States was immensely important. This is why the Turkish military desired to maintain its direct relationship with the United States in prior to the 1980 military coup, which, according to Harris, was neither "strange, mysterious nor unusual." "Not that the military made policy in Turkey,

but that if one were looking at the forces which would be interested in a continuing part of the relationship one might look to the military to find it. It seems to me still that may be true" (Harris 1980, p. 144; Çandar in Abramowitz 2000, p. 133; Nogaylaroğlu 2015, pp. 149, 218, 263; see also Tezkan 2013, p. 9; Ahmet Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015). Pakistani Defense Minister Admiral Afzal Rahman Khan said to Benjamin Oehlert, a former Coca-Cola executive who had arrived in the Pakistani capital as US Ambassador in July 1967 that "next to President Ayub… the military establishment" was America's best friend in Pakistan" (Haqqani, p. 119). For both Turkish and Pakistani generals, maintaining the military institutional link to the United States meant transmitting acquaintances and relationships to the next generation of commanders. For instance, General Asif Nawaz, who took over the leadership of the army in 1991 from General Aslam Beg, who had serious differences of opinion with the US over several issues starting with his eccentric views of Iran, enjoyed close relationship with General Joseph Hoar, who succeeded General Norman Schwarzkopf as the Head of CENTCOM in 1991 (Nawaz pp. 447–448). When General Abdul Waheed Kakar succeeded General Asif Nawaz, who passed away in office in 1993, to become the COAS in Pakistan, one of General Kakar's two concerns was that he did not know how to manage conversations with the Americans (his other concern was that he lacked the same level of knowledge of how the political system worked in Pakistan). However, he thought that General Nawaz had introduced him to CENTCOM Commander General Hoar and the new US Ambassador John Monjo previously in order to prepare him for this post (Nawaz 2008, p. 465).

Military Training and Socialization

The United States possessed a major channel or mechanism to influence a coup—help it succeed by signaling or thwart it—during the Cold War: Professional Military Education and Training. Knowing this understudied system may help understand how the United States may give a green light to a coup and may have prior knowledge of a coup attempt. Understanding this strategic tool may also tell us how the USA may absorb the news of a coup d'état better because military training programs allow it to penetrate the armed forces of a country and find the chance to have deep familiarity with it. There are of course particular cases and time periods when US military attachés thought "training

Egyptian officers in the United States provided an 'invaluable source of intelligence.'" (Sirrs 2010, p. 51). In other cases, even when the United States may not be alerted about an impending coup or may simply miss out on a coup, these channels may help it learn about the political inclinations and possible intentions of the coup makers after a coup happened and hence enable it chart a more informed policy.

Training was seen as a strategic issue during the Cold War; it was a battleground between the Soviets and the USA with each side perceiving the other's education and training of foreign officers as 'win' for one and 'lose' for the other. Providing military education and training to officers of allied and friendly nations was one of the most powerful means of achieving its foreign policy objectives for the United States since early years in the Cold War. When Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State in the Truman Administration, was coordinating with General Marshall, the Secretary of Defense, to better organize the US takeover of the historical British role in the Middle East, he proposed "to make available to the Arab states and Israel small military training missions, an increased number of places for their officers in US military schools, and token amounts of arms and ammunition for training purposes" (Acheson 1969, p. 562). Training foreign officers and getting to know them in the meantime had become a policy instrument in the Cold War politics ("The U.S. Security Assistance" 1985, p. 45).

The case of Afghanistan and US and Soviet competition to offer training may be very instructive. The Eisenhower Administration attached such importance to the issue that the NSC [National Security Council] 5701 report, entitled "U.S. Policy Toward South Asia," dated January 10, 1957 recommended the administration to "encourage Afghanistan to minimize its reliance upon the Communist bloc for military training and equipment, and to look to the United States and other free world sources for military training and assistance" ("Statement of Policy On U.S. Policy Toward South Asia", 1957, January 10). Following up from this recommendation, Undersecretary of State Christian Herter wrote to President Eisenhower that the Department of State and the Department of State shared the opinion that the USA must accept the Afghan government's request for US military training and opportunities to visit the USA for its personnel. Both US departments thought that doing so would advance US policy interests. The background reasoning was that "The presence of more than 400 Soviet bloc technicians, including personnel to train Afghan military forces, has enhanced the Communist subversion potential. This massive program, augmented by official visits

and cultural exchanges, constitutes a threat to Afghanistan's independence." President Eisenhower approved the program to commence ("Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Herter)", 1958, November 8). Herter also said that small-scale preliminary military training given to Afghan officers brought about positive results. "This program [the Pentagon's military training for 41 Afghan officers] has been instrumental in encouraging the Afghan authorities to have confidence in the desirability and practicability of seeking military training assistance in the free world in order to reduce their reliance on the Communist bloc for such training" ("Memorandum from the Under Secretary of State (Herter)" 1958, November 8).

It is for the importance of opportunities provided by military training and education that when the USA cut IMET and foreign military financing for countries such as Uruguay and Venezuela the Department of Defense and Commander of SOUTHCOM objected because the vacuum left by this withdrawal of aid is filled by China (Blakeley 2006, p. 1449). Lt. General Robert H. Warren, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Military Assistance and Sales, stated that "long experience has indicated that *training* is one of the most productive forms of military assistance investment, in that it fosters attitudes on the part of the trainee which lead to better mutual understanding and greater co-operation…" (quoted in Wolpin 1973, p. 13).

It was not only the United States that appreciated the significance of these training opportunities. When Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to prove his country's strategic importance to the United States in containing communism, he visited Washington and talked to most senior administration officials, including President Nixon in September 1973. Bhutto told his audience that the Soviets had their eyes fixated on capturing more than Afghanistan and India and he had no trust for Afghanistan's new president Mohammad Daoud because the coup brought Daoud to power and "the majors and colonels under him trained in the USSR" (Haqqani 2013, p. 201).

A former American Ambassador in Amman promoted the idea to use IMET funds to start military education and training of Jordanian officers. Otherwise, he speculated in 1979, "… without the IMET-sponsored training Jordanians might well have sought communist-conducted military training." The Ambassador reminded that Soviets had previously trained Jordanian officers and although those Soviet-trained officers did not yet play a significant role in Jordanian politics, one day they may.

Therefore, "the significant role of IMET in influencing Jordanian decision makers could prove to be a valuable asset and counterbalance as the eastern bloc-educated personnel attain influential positions in the years to come." ("Justification for IMET-Congressional" 1979b, November 22). Likewise, the American Embassy in Jiddah (Saudi Arabia) promoted professional courses on the account that "the professional courses contribute strongly toward better understanding of US polices and military professionalism. Generally, courses which last six months or longer benefit the US because families normally accompany students. This leads to a better understanding of the US in a positive way… If the Saudis decide to look elsewhere for training, England, France, and Pakistan probably would be the beneficiaries. This development would sharply retard the development of Saudi military competence and capability, would reduce purchases from the U.S. and would certainly worsen bilateral relations." ("Changes in Foreign Military Training" 1976, April 6).

The US Embassy in Islamabad was not unusual in attaching great significance to offering military training to Pakistani officers. The Embassy advised Washington in 1976 to emphasize 'career development courses' rather than other courses such as technical training. "Embassy believes career development courses give greatest benefit to our national interests in terms of relationship between FMTP [Foreign military training program] and our bilateral relations. The advantage to the us in having PAK military study U.S. techniques and work with us military in the States are considerable." The Embassy also reported that this was the preference of senior Pakistani officers as well. Since the Pakistan Army integrated US techniques, procedures and equipment into their services they want to continue US training ("Foreign Military Training Program" 1976, April 15).

Sometimes the USA subcontracted these military trainings to other countries during the Cold War. For instance, in trying to counterbalance the Soviets' geographic and historical advantage in offering training to Afghan officers, the USA wanted to utilize historical Turkish-Afghani relations by seeking an entry point via US military training programs. This meant that 'the U.S.-educated' Turkish officers transformed into 'the educators and trainers in U.S. methods'. In an Airgram sent from the US Embassy [Headed by Henry Byroade who had been sent in mid-April in 1959] in Afghanistan to the Department of State, the Embassy saw it necessary "to offset Soviet influence within the military" and "attempt to broaden our [American] knowledge as to what is going on within the military itself". To this end, the Embassy suggested, Turks

should be encouraged to open a general staff college to train Afghan officers (NATO 2014; Yamak 2006, pp. 157–164).[11] The USA wished that Turkey would extend these training programs to the Syrian officers as well, without contradicting or rivaling the training given by the French to the Syrian officers. This was not just to militarily strengthen Syria or Afghanistan but also to form ties between the West and these states under the Soviet radar or influence (McGhee 1990, pp. 126–127). In proof of the pro-NATO sentiments prevalent among some officers of the Turkish military and their corresponding hardline anti-Soviet stance, Kemal Yamak, who was sent to Afghanistan with a group of Turkish officers to train Afghan officers, was very suspicious of the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan and became concerned about the pro-Soviet sentiments and sympathies growing among the Afghan officers. This could have produce dire outcomes because some of these junior Afghan officers had the chance to come to Turkish Military Academy, advanced training courses, and even Turkish Armed Forces College. This created the risk that these pro-Soviet Afghan officers would learn about NATO issues, principles and methods through these courses. Turkish officers concerned about the unwanted Soviet penetration into Afghanistan through training matters duly warned the authorities in Turkey (Yamak, p. 170; Ulay 1996, pp. 41–43).

Professional Military Education

Professional military education (PME) is one of the longest and most extensive channels the United States maintains with armed forces in other countries. The United States has trained 500,000 foreign officers under PME programs since 1950 (Isenberg 1992). The US Army War College in Carlisle Barracks in Pennsylvania graduated over 700 international fellows from about 100 nations since 1978. The Naval War College in Rhode Island graduated over 1,500 senior naval officers from nearly 90 countries, half of its alumni reached flag rank and 10 percent became chiefs of their navies (Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 120). 7,500 military officers from allies and friendly nations graduated from

[11] More details about a group of Turkish officers who went to Afghanistan to train Afghan officers in starting from early February can be found in Yamak's memoirs (pp. 157–164).

the US Army's Command and General Staff College (CGSC) from 1894 to 2014.

The number of graduate officers who reached the rank of general was more than half and 253 trainees coming from 73 countries reached the position of chief of staff in their militaries. By April 2014, 28 officers from Command and General Staff College CGSC) went all the way to the top to become heads of their states (Atkinson 2015, p. 22). According to Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, 700 Turkish naval officers received education in Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey/California since the 1960s. The number of staff officers who finished Naval War College in New Port Rhode Island was 100. Among these 100 staff officers 70 percent became admirals and some went on to command the Turkish Navy. The number of other officers and sergeants who used professional military education funds for professional military courses reached thousands over the years (Gürdeniz 2013, p. 225). To provide more exact figures, between FY1950 and FY1983 20,413 Turkish military officers were trained in the United States. (Gabelnik et al. 1999) In addition to more random military-to-military relationship as in between militaries of Pakistan and Turkey, which have had historically very amiable relations, military-to-military contacts are purposefully nurtured by means of military training and education offered, joint exercises held, disaster relief and peacekeeping operations, and NATO posts and duties served (Dennis 2013, pp. 8–9). IMET (International Military Education and Training) is only one of such programs that the successive US administrations have now maintained since 1976. The idea behind professional military education programs is identical with other similar programs run by France to the United Kingdom among others (Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 123).

The United States pursued some objectives with professional training and education programs. To begin with, the United States governments hoped that with joint military education and training 'interoperability' would be possible during jointly executed operations. Since several militaries around the world adopted US military manuals, tactics and strategies and modified their military academies according to West Point in the course of the Cold War (Tezkan 2013, pp. 111, 221), it was important to teach foreign military officers how to command US military equipment and different weapons, which in corollary allowed for better cooperation with the U.S. army during real military operations (Bernath

1985, p. 10; Drew 1985, p. 33; Wolpin 1972, p. 12). It was with the help of inter-military relationships with Pakistan, Senegal, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt that the international coalition against Iraq in the first Gulf War functioned well on the ground (McCoy 1994, p. 3) "In quickly planning and coordinating Operation Provide Comfort in 1991, both the State and Defense Departments benefitted from close relationships among several U.S. foreign service officers, U.S. military officers, and their Turkish military counterparts, all of whom had met as students at U.S. war colleges" (Cope, p. 28).

Secondly, these programs allowed the USA to display its military equipment and weapons in action to guest officers and allowed them to use so that they could witness their superiority, in the hope that these officers would file a demand for these weapons as they rise through the ranks (Bilget 2002, p. 105; Cope, pp. 32–33; "Security Assistance, Observations" 1990, p. 5; see also Wolpin 1972, p. 28, footnote w).

One of the most important long-term policy objectives, however, was *supposedly* to spread democracy by *showing* foreign officers how democracy works in America, enhancing military-to-military relationships to assist US foreign policy goals, and developing better understanding of US military doctrine and technology by offering this massive training program for varying durations to officers of foreign nations (Security Assistance, Observations 1990, p. 5). However, "American policy makers perceive the MAP [Military Assistance Programs] and especially its concomitant training relationships as a means of maximizing the responsiveness of foreign officers to U.S. policy goals for their countries" (Wolpin 1972, p. 16). As Secretary Nutter, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (1969–1973), said about US military training programs, "it is extremely important to maintain our relations with the people who are in positions of influence in those countries so we can help influence the course of events in those countries" (Wolpin 1972, pp. 17, 21–22).

An equally important outcome the United States expected from PME and training programs is establishing rapport and acquaintance between military officers who are very likely to rise up the military hierarchy.[12]

[12]The United States is not alone in thinking this way; Retired Turkish commanders empathize very easily with the objectives of these programs because Turkey too executes similar program at the Turkish Armed Forces College (*Türk Silahlı Kuvvetler Akademisi*)

"Military-to-military contacts afforded by the IMET program are particularly important in this region [the Middle East], paying dividends far into the future as students rise up the military and political ranks of their respective countries" (Hellenic Resources Network., n.d.). Officers taking these education and training programs in the USA did rise to prominent positions when they went returned home. When Rtd. General Edip Başer, Commander of the 2nd Army, went to US Army War College in June 1980, two of his classmates were Egyptian Major General Amin Namer and Sultan al-Mutahheri from Saudi Arabia. The former rose to Head of Egyptian Intelligence later while al-Mutahheri became the Commander of Saudi Land Forces (Başer 2014, pp. 154–155). As a retired Turkish Major General pointed out:

> If you are spending huge sums of money on something, making big investments you would expect returns from it. In Middle Eastern countries such as ours the ruling actor is the military; so is in Egypt and Israel… If you tie the military in these places to yourself, not in terms of giving money but in terms of being admired and if they admire and appreciate you, your system, *if you have an army that admires you as a counterpart I would communicate with them more easily, not in the sense of getting them attempt a coup but keeping dialogue, channels of communication*. (Y. Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015; italics added)

A key concept associated with military education and training programs is 'socialization'. Whether the level of analysis is individuals or states, the concept of socialization implies "a process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community [of individuals or states]… successful socialization results in the internalization of the prescribed norms and rules. The new norms come to be taken for granted—accepted because they are seen as normal, given "who we are"" (Gheciu 2005,

for the same purposes. When Turkish generals met a foreign officer occupying higher positions and showing extra interest and attention to the Turkish guests during foreign visits, they tended to describe the situation as 'we won him over' (Yılmaz Tezkan, personal communication, August 6, 2015). "Officers who take education here in Turkey come to important posts when they go back to their home countries. For instance, the current Chief of Army Staff in Albania took education here. Hosni Mubarak did the same at some point as well; Qaddafi and Musharraf too" (Ahmet Bertan Nogaylaroğlu, personal communication).

p. 976; Jervis 2015, p. 609; Terhalle 2009, pp. 557–586). Political socialization by schooling, family and other social groupings are important for formation of political culture (Grigoriadis 2009, p. 18). "Social influence refers to a class of microprocesses that elicit pro-norm behavior through the distribution of social rewards and punishments… Punishments might include shaming, shunning, exclusion, and demeaning, or dissonance derived from actions inconsistent with role and identity" (Johnston 2001, p. 499; Keeley 2004, p. 428). The concept has risen to more prominence in international relations after the Cold War ended to describe the process whereby NATO and the West guided and managed democratic transition in the former Soviet space, especially Central and Eastern Europe, by 'changing the way civilian and military actors in these places think' (Gheciu, pp. 986–988). Military-to-military contacts with the Western officers—provided through training and education, joint operations, and NATO ties as stated before—emerged as particular method of de-communizing the armed forces in Eastern and Central Europe through the "socializing environment" NATO provided (Rice 1992, p. 30; Johnston, p. 507; İsmail Hakkı Pekin, personal communication, August 26, 2015; see also Huntington 1996, p. 7; Diamond and Platter 1996, p. xxxiii; Christopher 2001, p. 273; Nye 1996, pp. 153–156; Talbott 2004, p. 110).

Military education programs may particularly work well for purposes of socialization because such programs involve a certain duration of time and involve limited number of people for iteration, which may increase sustained exposure. The PME programs are tailored towards that goal. The US military schools that offer training programs employ, either voluntarily or by formal programs, volunteer people and families from the local area, where the residents in the local area help the incoming foreign officers with tasks such as enrolling their children at schools, offer English language classes, and organize social events (Atkinson, p. 23). The environment as well as the classes offered such as military history, strategic theory, international relations, civil-military relations provide a "common frame of reference". In this sense, professional military education programs such as IMET are different from civilian exchange programs. The differences lie mainly in "how the classroom is organized to the extensive amount of social interaction and experiential learning that is planned outside of the classroom by the military schools" (Atkinson 2015, p. 20). The entire military exchange programs also include 'Field

Studies Program', whereby foreign officers are exposed "to the U.S. way of life, including regard for democratic values, respect for individual civil and human rights, and belief in the rule of law" (Atkinson 2015, p. 24). In the field trips or, 'orientation tours' (Wolpin 1972, pp. 33–34), officers are shown US institutions, society and culture such as Starbucks headquarters in Seattle, facilities for horse riding, the Congress (Atkinson, pp. 24–25; see also Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 121; Goodpaster quoted in Rowe 1974, p. 240, footnote 3).

As an interviewee said, "all visits arranged for foreign officers to meet U.S. families and travels to various cities in the context of military education and training can be discussed under the concept of socialization efforts. These were all included in the program to disseminate the western values" (personal communication, August 24, 2015). The effects of military training and education programs offered by the United States can also be understood in terms of 'military soft power'. If "soft power is the ability to achieve goals by persuading or socializing others to adopt your own perspectives and preferences", it may be claimed that socialization of military officers may also augment the U.S. soft power. For these exchanges are one way that the U.S. military extends its influence through ideas, beliefs, and norms" (Atkinson 2015, p. 28). As generations of officers receive military training and education in the United States, the cumulative effect of such programs may increase in parallel. It may be natural that after a few generations of officers are trained in the United States, there could emerge a "network of military exchange graduates" in a country and they would like to rely on each other as they get promoted because they received the same education with similar equipment, tactics and strategies. "The network within any one country is important in helping senior officers to update, improve, or reform military doctrine and military operations by providing a support system of similarly trained colleagues who are likely to share the same goals" (Atkinson 2015, pp. 26–27).

These programs aim to show the bankruptcy of communism as opposed to working/functioning democracy in the USA, with the additional benefit of US affluence, could be shown more effectively to foreign officers by hosting them in the United States. According to Lefever, "since military officers are active politically [in the Third World], any democratic ideas they may have gained during a U.S. training tour can have a small positive effect as they become advisors or participants in the top policy-making elite" (Lefever 1980, p. 283; Gibler and Ruby 2002/2003, p. 120; Ruby and Gibler 2010, pp. 347, 359). Hence, these programs provide venues for socializing the trainees into the norms and

values the USA would like to spread. As Secretary of State William Rogers under the Nixon Administration also said to justify military training programs, "whether we like it or not, the military holds political power in many countries and exerts great deal of influence on national policies in others. Our training program affords military leaders from all over the world an introduction to the United States and to Americans, to our free and open society, and to the achievement of our form of government" (Wolpin 1972, p. 25, see also Secretary of Defense Robert MacNamara's remarks on p. 28, and General Lemnitzer's remarks on p. 29).

However, showing foreign officers how US society and government operated and was superior to communist/socialist system did not necessarily entail teaching democratic values and in particular civilian supremacy to foreign military officers. It is important to note that in some US military schools foreign officers were taught that "… within a militant cold war context, there are the self-assumed 'responsibilities' of the military to 'society' and the tasks which confront the 'nation.' Attention is focused upon the importance of political knowledge for officers and the legitimacy of their aspirations for national leadership roles to solve socio-economic developments problems and to combat the world wide menace of communism" (Wolpin 1972, p. 63).

According to Brooks, while interaction with professionalized US soldiers during training and joint exercises may exert "socialization effects" on the Tunisian armed forces, they also "afford the armed services some degree of internal autonomy and insulation from regime institutions" (Brooks 2013, pp. 214–215; Bowman 2013). Truly, there had been moments when the USA seriously treated military training as an opportunity to instill professional ethic, respect for civilian government in foreign officers' minds, such as the training and education given to Cuban officers in the 1940s and 1950s (Kirkland 2003, p. 81). Yet, "The United States' primary goal was to foster and strengthen anticommunist regimes in Latin America (Kirkland 2003, pp. 88–99).

One of the best moments to assess the claims that NATO and PME programs such as IMET helped to expose foreign officers to democratic norms and values is attitudes adopted towards to-be-high-ranking officers of military that just carried out a coup. Naming, shaming, and cutting PME funding are also instruments of democracy promotion and socialization. Although Hale argued Turkey's membership in NATO alliance created strong pressures for the policies followed by the [1980] military regime after the coup and for respecting democratic norms (Hale 1994, p. 323; see also Criss 2011, p. 294), NATO and U.S. practice seem

to have been just the opposite. Several retired military officers say that NATO never rebuked Turkish officers about their military interventions, neither did it warn them about the consequences of their actions. Neither NATO nor the US was a force for socializing foreign officers into democratic norms and values. All NATO cared for was Western interests and struggle against communism during the Cold War (Erdoğan Karakuş, personal communication, July 29, 2015; M. Hikmet Bayar, August 8, 2015; A. Yavuz, personal communication, December 16, 2015; İsmail Hakkı Pekin, personal communication, August 26, 2015).

For instance, General Tamer Akbaş was assigned to AFSOUTH Plans and Policy Division three weeks before the September 12 coup. When he heard the news of the coup, he thought that because of the civil war-like conditions in the homeland, the military had to intervene and it was the correct decision. The important point is that NATO Plans and Policies Division Chief Tuğgeneral T. Kelly gave General Akbaş an article on the September 12 coup written by a British writer, in which the writer analyzed the Turkish military and finished the article by saying that "the Turkish Armed Forces is the people" (Akbaş 2014, pp. 118–120).

This does not seem to be a marginal anecdote. Edip Başer became the first cadet to be trained in US War College as of June 1980. On the morning of the September 12 coup, an US colonel named Chuck Westfeeling, who had been to Turkey on military duty, told Başer in Turkish that he should be happy, the Turkish military intervened the night before and he guessed somebody had to do this in order to stop the bloodshed (Başer, pp. 157–158). When Sabri Yirmibeşoğlu was assigned to NATO Headquarters in Brussels in 1971 and the military gave the government an ultimatum on March 12, he reports that some British officers told him that 'they wished they had a similar military and generals" (vol. 1, p. 279).

The same weakness in the argument about democratic socialization by military training programs and NATO is illustrated by the fact that "A young Pakistani major named Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq spent a year at Fort Leavenworth, where he was 'adopted' by a mail carrier named Ed and his wife, Dollie. Years later, Ed and Dollie were invited to the Reagan administration's 1982 state dinner for Zia, who installed himself in a coup and held onto power for over a decade through brutal repression" (Powell cited in Savage and Caverley, p. 6). Any positive effect of exposure to democratic norms taught and preached through NATO and PME programs may be neutered by these practices and reactions. It also

shows that the US generals and officers did not do any public shaming, anything that could show displeasure at the course of action Turkish military chose with military coups d'état.

What military education and training opportunities the USA provided may have conversely done is that they socialized foreign officers into prioritizing *stability* and *order* before democracy. Very strikingly, writing about the establishment and work in Turkey of the *United States Air Force Group* Livingston forwarded a very different understanding of the democratic benefits of US military training. According to him, the start of courses taught by an US detachment at the War Staff College as of 1949, helped teach Turkish staff officers not only about US command and staff procedures, but also Western military doctrine, political, and social thought. As a result, "the subtle transmission of democratic ideals to younger, more progressive officers was evident in the way Turkish officers played their role in the military coups that occurred in Turkey in 1960, 1970 and 1980. Each time they perceived themselves as the guardians of true republican ideology, handing national control over to civilians after resolving the invidiousness that had brought the country to the brink of anarchy" (Livingston 1994, p. 813). This curious idea seems to suggest that infusing democratic norms and ideals through professional military education and training was not meant to curtail the idea of coup per se and eliminate interventionist tendencies but rather to encourage handing over power to civilians after carrying out a military coup d'état.

In addition, as much as foreign aid (military and economic assistance) does not automatically translate into unconditional support/subservience of the recipient country officers (Akhund, p. 242; Cohen 2010, p. 143; Musa 1984, pp. 121–123, 146–150; see also Kıyat 2010, p. 331; see also Tezkan 2013, pp. 221–243, Akbaş, pp. 112–113), teaching human rights, civilian control, and democracy for a year may neither significantly change organizational culture(s) of militaries, especially of those with established record of intervention in politics, nor make them submissive to US or Western demands. As Taw pointed out,

> The few months a foreign military student spends in the United States are unlikely to radically alter his cultural, social, or political views. International military students may acquire an improved understanding of the American political system and social culture, and some may develop affection for the United States, but studies suggest that the majority of

> IMS [International Military Student] will return to their home countries with the same basic *Weltanschauung* as when they left (Taw 1994, p. 10)

International Organizations and Socialization

In addition to military education and training programs the United States (as well as several other countries) offer, international organizations such as NATO may also serve as equally, if not more, efficient platforms and venues for socialization and consolidation of bilateral institutional linkages. International organizations, several scholars argue, especially with reference to the Cold War period, may exert socializing influences on the participants:

> An even stronger impact of regional military organizations on the military and its attitudes toward democracy can come in the form of socialization. Regional alliances and military organizations, especially those that conduct joint training operations or maintain permanent institutions (such as NATO), can help to socialize military leaders in member states as to the role of the military in domestic society. While this may or may not be the goal of membership, this socialization process may occur through interactions in the institution. Socialization amounts to persuading military leaders that the role of the military is not to act as an internal police force, but rather to protect the state from outside forces… By interacting with military leaders of other states who subscribe to these types of doctrines, military elites in autocratic or recently autocratic states are more likely to internalize these doctrines, making them more likely to accept full democracy. This issue may be important not only in the military's acceptance of an initial move towards liberalization, but in completing the transition to democracy. (Pevehouse 2002, pp. 527–528)

NATO, in particular, is put forward as a socializing force because it was meant to be more than a military alliance (İnan 1981, p. 170; NATO 2014). According to Lieutenant General Nogaylaroğlu, "NATO assignments carried the potential to have possible socializing effects because always 2–3 officers from different nationalities work together in a NATO office, decisions are made after due discussions, and in no office military officers of the same nationality work by themselves" (Nogaylaroğlu, p. 169).

As a former Pakistani Ambassador argued to draw a contrast between CENTO and NATO alliances, "NATO was not just a military alliance. It was a multifaceted alliance of most advanced nations in the world having close links of culture, civilization, religion, race, political systems and

values which was in confrontation with another similar combination, mainly Slavic based on Communism" (Koreshi 2012, p. 92). Truly, as a retired military officer noted, NATO membership went beyond being a guarantee for Turkey's security for the ruling Turkish elite in the 1950s (including the Democrat Party). It meant security, westernization, and military and economic progress (personal communication, August 24, 2015; also Yılmaz 2012). As retired Major General Nogaylaroğlu said, "we entered the NATO as a consequence of a threat perception [from the Soviets]. Turkey would either be on its own or pick the Soviet or U.S. side. We chose the west… Although Turkey was on the wrong warring side in the WWI, we then established the Republic and we institutionalized our western orientation by entry into NATO 20–30 years after the independence" (personal communication, June 9, 2015). As much as NATO was seen as a guarantor against the Soviet designs and demands on Turkey, especially the Bosporus (Edip Başer, personal communication, October 31, 2015; Yamak 2006, p. 57), it was also a powerful cultural symbol for the Turkish civilian and military elite at the same time (Gönlübol 1975, p. 15; Baytok 2005, pp. 20, 21; see also İnan 1981, pp. 14–15; Torumtay n.d., p. 20; Erkaya n.d., p. 29).

NATO membership was, therefore, not just a choice of necessity but an outcome of willing participation. In that sense it was not regarded just a military organization but also a cultural alliance (Yılmaz and Bilgin, p. 44). This is why when the Chief of British General Staff visited Turkey in the late 1940s and repeatedly kept referring to Turkey and its environment as "here in the Middle East" during his meetings with the Turkish generals, he was politely warned by the Turkish generals that "Turkey is a European country" (Lewis 1980, p. 17).[13] It is for that additional value of NATO membership that, Karaosmanoğlu argued, the civilian and military leadership spurned the British proposal that Turkey takes up a role in Middle East defense formation early in the Cold War. Instead Turkey wanted to join the European Command (2011, p. 43). When then Foreign Minister Fuat Köprülü explained to the Grand National

[13] Even though both Iran and Turkey were members of CENTO, theirs was a "working arrangement" and they distrusted each other. "The Shah said [in 1967 and before] the trouble with the Turks was that they would like to regard themselves as Europeans and not Orientals" (Baxter 2013, pp. 21, 70).

Assembly Turkey's NATO entry he said that the "Atlantic Charter is not a military defense mechanism; it is an agreement for cooperation and solidarity that aims at material and moral progress in the largest sense. The sensitive and dangerous political conditions surrounding us cause everybody to focus disproportionately on the Charter's military dimension" (Türk Atlantik, p. 105).[14] A small booklet, published in 1982 by the Turkish Atlantic Treaty Association [Türk Atlantik Antlaşması Derneği] to celebrate the 30th anniversary of Turkey's NATO membership and featured a celebration message by President Evren showed perception of NATO by political and military leadership. The booklet described NATO as "the largest political, military and civilization alliance in history" (Türk Atlantik, p. vii). According to former Chief of General Staff Özkök,

> NATO became Turkey's and TAF's window opening to the West. We all saw peoples of different countries there, witnessed their values, saw their countries and peoples and knew their armed forces. Thus, these allowed us to understand that the Western values are good enough to suit us. For this reason, I think that external missions through NATO brought great advantages for Turkey. Now civilians and young people go abroad and know the West too but at the time mostly soldiers went abroad for such duties and missions. Therefore, military officers became more western and progressive. (Özkök 2012, p. 5)

"Turkey's "westernness" has been expressed, not only through the transfer of ideas and manners from the West (as happened since Ottoman times), but also through joining Western institutions such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)"[15] (Yılmaz and Bilgin 2005–2006, p. 39; see also Karaosmanoğlu 2011b, pp. 44–46).

[14] For statements by various high ranking civilian and military officials along the same lines, see Türk Atlantik (pp. 6–20, 51–63, 71–82).

[15] High-ranking Turkish generals were at great pains to show to their NATO colleagues and western counterparts that Turkey was too Western, its women wore modern clothes and its peoples listened to and played modern music. LSE [NATO Land Southeast Command in İzmir] Commander Akbaş recounted a proud story, where İzmir Chamber Orchestra (İzmir Oda Orkestrası) gave a concert at the NATO Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe based in İzmir. Foreign guests were pleasantly surprised because 'they had expected an oriental music with players and singers wearing fez (fes) (Akbaş, p. 126).; As an interviewee told the author, "you can use the concept of socialization for military education and training programs the US delivers. But there is no point in dancing around these concepts so much; the whole thing comes down westernization, adoption and transfer of western values" (personal communication, August 24, 2015).

While Turkey joined NATO and became allies with the USA for both security and identity-related reasons, Pakistan allied with the UAS primarily "to compensate for its economic and military disadvantages" (Haqqani 2013, p. 9; the Soviet threat felt by Turkey was real; Ulay 1996, pp. 32–33, 48). The reason Jinnah thought communism or pro-Soviet stance was not an option for Pakistan was not because they adopted a strictly western identity but rather because of Pakistan's undeniable Islamic identity from the founding (Haqqani 2013, p. 35). In return, as argued before, US devotion to Pakistan was wanting, as many Pakistani officials saw it. Pakistan had only "marginal utility" for US policy-makers in the context of the Cold War. US alignment with Pakistan in the second half of the 1950s and in the 1980s were "temporary security alignment" (Siddiqa-Agha 2003, pp. 91–92).

Here Turkey differed greatly from Pakistan, not only in terms of how Turkish policy-makers perceived the West but also how the UA. perceived Turkish orientation as well. According to John Foster Dulles, Turkey stood out for two main reasons; unlike Pakistan, Turkey felt direct and immediate objective threat from the Soviets because of its geographic location; secondly, again unlike Pakistan, "Ataturk's Western orientation was unambiguous, and the Turks had given military bases as part of NATO and had suffered more than seven hundred fatalities fighting alongside the Americans in Korea" (Haqqani, p. 73). Despite its close relationship with the West, Pakistan's stance was far more guarded, hesitant and reserved than Turkey.

An area this directly became clear was the Korean War and the differing Turkish and Pakistan responses to the US request for soldiers in Korea. Pakistan supported the effort only rhetorically and by lobbying the Arab states on the US' behalf (Haqqani 2013, p. 51) while Turkey officially did not hesitate, sending around 5000 soldiers to Korea. When the USA asked a Pakistani contingent to fight with the UN force under General MacArthur, Pakistan conditioned its support to US assistance and promise to Pakistan against India. In other words, Pakistani governing elite used the US request as a bargaining chip to elicit more economic and military support from the United States. Dean Acheson rejected the Pakistani terms and said that Pakistan should send soldiers to Korea as a responsibility and not hold it as a bargaining chip (Haqqani, pp. 52–53).

The Western commitment to Turkey ran deeper, was more institutional, and was more multilayered. Even when Pakistan was invited to

join SEATO, which was designed as a bulwark and deterrence against communism in Southeast Asia in 1954, Pakistan viewed the alliance as a facilitator of US aid while Secretary of State Dulles told the Pakistani authorities that "it was in Pakistan's own interest to join SEATO but it should not join to force the United States to assist Pakistan" (Sattar 2013, p. 52). According to Nye, [Secretary of State] Dulles turned to these semi-regional replicas of NATO [CENTO and SEATO] because he thought he could sell them easy to the Congress, thanks to the fact that these organizations entailed limited U.S. responsibility and burden (Nye 1969, p. 725).

Neither CENTO nor SEATO provided the same level of military, social, economic, cultural, and political linkages as NATO (Acharya 2011, pp. 55, 102; Brecher 1963, p. 224; Saeed Khalid, personal communication, June 4, 2016). In the case of CENTO, the United States did not even join the bloc but became an outside observer and only remotely associated with the defense and political committees of the alliance (Sattar, p. 55). Several other observers also noted the limited US commitment to both SEATO and CENTO (Rao as cited in Jabeen and Mazhar 2011, pp. 120; also Acharya, p.110; Braibanti 1957, pp. 328, 330). Britain as the other major power in CENTO was also skeptical toward the bloc and members' commitment. According to the British, "Iran was the key country of the CENTO alliance… Turkey was satisfied in military and economic terms with her participation in NATO. Ankara viewed CENTO as a secondary alliance; Pakistan was also a member of SEATO (Southeast Asia Treaty Organization)" (Dimitrakis, p. 319). The British kept their very reserved attitude until CENTO dissolved in 1979. It remained skeptical of CENTO and for that matter of any moves that sought to transform it into anything more than it could be. CENTO was never to be a military alliance in the way NATO was (Vatanka 2015, p. 132).

Pakistani generals themselves voiced criticism of the US non-committal to CENTO. Pakistan's Commander-in-Chief from 1958 to 1966, General Mohammad Musa, complained, "not being a full-fledged member, they [US officials] attended meetings only as observers and thus remained uncommitted" (Musa 1984, pp. 147, 174, 176). US officials too seem to be disenchanted with the level of willingness CENTO members showed in cooperating. According to a US diplomat working on CENTO issues in Ankara, CENTO members never cooperated in the

NATO scale; they all wanted to take from the pool but did not want to really contribute to it (Vatanka, p. 44). The State Department asked the US President to make clear that the US show of commitment requested by CENTO members would not come. The USA was not going to tie itself definitely to their defense (Vatanka, p. 24). In the perceived absence of US commitment, Pakistan's participation in both CENTO and SEATO remained "pro forma" (Tahir-Kheli, p. 12). The softening US-Soviet relations in the second half of the 1960s rendered "CENTO to an anachronism" as well (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 158).

As Pakistan—US relations deteriorated after the country's 1965 war with India, Pakistan started to reevaluate the usefulness of NATO and found achievements of SEATO only modest (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 695). It dawned increasingly on Pakistan that "Unlike NATO, it [SEATO] provided only for consultations, not joint action, in the event of aggression against one of its members. Nor did the treaty envisage the provision of defense and economic assistance"[16] (Sattar 2013, p. 53; Venkataramani, pp. 344—348, 356–358). Both SEATO and CENTO provide a façade that the USA wants to keep in the symbolic sense (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 158). Vatanka is perhaps correct in this sense to call SEATO "NATO's dysfunctional sibling" (Vatanka, 17). Ayub Khan even questioned in the late 1960s why Pakistan joined SEATO in the first place. He concluded that in retrospect neither SEATO nor CENTO offered any military contribution for Pakistan in its hour of need. The military aspect of these organizations were more irritating than ever helpful (*Twenty Years of Pakistan* 1967, p. 157).

According to the US State Department, "by the close of the Eisenhower Administration", it had become clear to CENTO members that that the organization was a better conduit for economic and technical cooperation than it was a military alliance" (The Baghdad Pact (1955)). Furthermore, neither CENTO nor SEATO was equipped with a NATO-like command structure. General Ayub Khan's desire expressed in a meeting with President Eisenhower in December 1959 that CENTO would remain a "paper tiger" without a permanent military command structure never materialized (see also Campbell 1958,

[16] Pakistan withdrew from SEATO in 1972 but remained in CENTO until its dissolution with the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979.

p. 193; "Memorandum of a Conversation", 1959, December 8). The steady deterioration in Pakistani—US relations after the early 1960s, closer relations between Pakistan, China, and the Soviet Union to the USA's dismay directly influenced Pakistan's participation in CENTO as it disengaged from it and did not join naval and other exercises until many years later in the 1970s (Dimitrakis 2009, pp. 318–320; Tahir-Kheli, 19; Koreshi 2012, pp. 33, 83). When Bhutto acceded to restart Pakistani participation in CENTO military exercises, this was due to request of the Shah, whom Bhutto valued for its financial and military contributions (Vatanka, p. 93). The Pakistani disenchantment with CENTO became so deep that Ayub Khan said after 1965 that 'they no longer have any faith in CENTO' (Baxter 2013, pp. 16, 170).

The fact that no US Administration was warm to the idea of making CENTO a military alliance led Ayub Khan to say, "the Americans have no intention of putting military life into it [CENTO]. If it has to continue, it should be called what it is: an economic arrangement of a limited type" (Baxter 2013, p. 89). Shahinshah of Iran shared the same feeling about CENTO and complained that CENTO lacked military plans (Vatanka, p. 55). As Pakistan wanted to diversify its policy options after its war with India in 1965, it became increasingly unwilling to do anything to draw the Soviets' ire. When CENTO members wanted to call for a ministerial meeting after Arab-Israeli war in 1967, Ayub Khan rejected the call, saying that the Soviets may find such a meeting as an unfriendly act and it would be unwise to do so before his impending visit to Moscow (Baxter 2013, pp. 112, 165). Ayub Khan wrote in his memoirs that the Shah of Iran was too unhappy with CENTO but just wanted to keep it alive until another similar entity replaces it (Baxter, 19). Ayub Khan then came up with a new regional scheme called 'Regional Cooperation for Development' (RCD) to compensate what CENTO woefully lacked (Vatanka, p. 42). His RCD design purposefully excluded politics and military affairs to enable collaboration in the economic and cultural fields (Ayub Khan 1967, p. 156). Even RCD's modest objectives did not materialize (Arif 1995, p. 281). When Pakistan did show renewed interest in CENTO after 1972 it was because PM Bhutto wanted to send a signal of readiness to cooperate with the USA as well. Yet, this time the USA deprioritized South Asia among its ambit of strategic interests. For the first twenty months of Bhutto government the USA was represented at the level of Charge d'Affaires (Hussain, pp. 235–236).

With the less-than-desired attention given to CENTO as opposed to NATO, its impact on the socialization of Pakistani officers into

democratic norms remained minimal. Sixteen years after its founding, Pakistani military officers unabashedly praised the Turkish military's March 12 military memorandum during a CENTO meeting. According to General Yirmibeşoğlu, who represented the Turkish General Staff in the meeting, "according to Pakistani officers, democracy was only a means to survival of the state, which, when at stake, may require military intervention. This was a military's legal duty even when it went against the constitution" (Yirmibeşoğlu, vol. 2, p. 60).

Discussion

The major effect of international organizations such as NATO and professional military education opportunities in the West on the Turkish officer corps has been confirmation of Turkey's westernness. It also exposed Turkish officers to the greatness of the 'West', the USA, in particular, on social, political, technological, and military dimensions. The program at the NATO Defense College, for instance, included two external visits in addition to the routine college curriculum. Three officers, who later became full generals in the Turkish army, note in their memoirs how impressed they had become with the West after these visits and wished that Turkey would achieve the same one day (Bayar, vol. 1, pp. 519–520, 524; Akbaş 2014, pp. 111–112; Torumtay, p. 69). Some Turkish officers, who later reached higher ranks within the TAF, saw officers and diplomats of some NATO members for the first time when they were sent to NATO Defense College and know them and interact with them, which was an "extraordinary opportunity" (Akbaş, p. 109).

These professional sojourns in the West 'affirmed' officers' western identity (Başer, p. 143; Kıyat, pp. 207, 247–252; Bayar, vol. 1, p. 568; İlter Türkmen, personal communication, November 16, 2015). Turkey's integration into Western socialization structure worked so well overall that Turkish officers were no longer at the receiving end of socialization efforts that sped up after the Cold War[17]; Turkish officers became

[17]Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili put forward the concept of the Partnership for Peace in late 1993. According to the proposal, nations of Central and Eastern Europe would be able to sign separate partnerships with NATO and thus participate in NATO training exercises and have the chance to consult with NATO on military strategy and tactics. However, they would only have the chance to consult NATO if they come under attack by any power and not enjoy the collective defense under NATO. This process was envisaged to ease their gradual integration to NATO over the coming years. See Christopher (2001, p. 276).

socializers in programs directed at new NATO candidates in the new era (Nogaylaroğlu, p. 165; Akbaş, pp. 196, 216–217, 231–232; Bir 1998; Bernath 1985, p. 5).

If international organizations and professional military education imbue foreign officers with a deep respect for democratic norms and the principle of civilian supremacy (Correspondence: NATO, p. 225) the density of Turkish—Western ties should have made it more difficult to carry on an illegal act as a military coup d'état (Levitsky and Way 2006, p. 385). However, it may very well be true that the "pro-democratizing effects of military-to-military contacts may be overstated. One pro-enlargement argument is that NATO membership will produce military-to-military contacts that will facilitate the establishment of norms respecting civilian control of the military. The experiences of Portugal, Spain, Greece, and Turkey during the Cold War cast doubt, however, on the veracity of this claim" (Correspondence: NATO, p. 233). As Cizre pointed out,

> Turkey's history with NATO does indeed weaken the thesis that NATO membership helps to spread the reformative norms of Decaf [Democratic Control of the Armed Forces] by either making it a condition of membership or by increasing intergovernmental contacts between member militaries. One explanation for the Turkish situation is that NATO's overarching political objective was containment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War, which was implemented at the expense of democratization for the then peripheral countries such as Greece, Spain, Portugal and Turkey. (2004, p. 116)

The most significant expectation from such training opportunities was rather rapport with and access to foreign officers, most of whom, as stated above, were very likely to climb up the ladder of position of influence in their own countries in the following years. "The 'Hall of Fame' data (distinguished foreign graduates) maintained by the service schools shows that a large number of foreign graduates become chiefs of their services, militaries, or hold other senior positions in their countries several years after graduating from US PME" (Ruby and Gibler 2010, p. 345). This was the case with Thailand and Philippines where, as of 1994, majority of senior leadership in the Thai military were trained in the USA (Taw 1994, pp. 25, 44). It was for this reason that IMET training seeks to target officers (and also civilians with E-IMET far later) that

are likely to gain positions of prominence after returning their country (Reynolds 2003, p. 94; Savage and Caverley 2014, p. 18; McCoy 1994, p. 4).[18] This is why "the program is also a *long-range investment in many persons, some of whom may later play a significant political role*" (Lefever, p. 291 (italics added); Isenberg 1992; Weiner 2008, p. 150). Karakuş confirmed that military training and education abroad helps relationships to be founded and allows access (personal communication, July 29, 2015; also see Taw, p. 20; Lefever, p. 281). In the case of Turkey, the US Ambassador to Ankara, Ronald Spiers, wrote to Washington in late 1979 the following report on the benefits of IMET program for US interests:

> The IMET program takes on a special importance in Turkey where our influence with the military, perhaps the most stable element in Turkish society today, is crucial to the successful completion of the current defense cooperation negotiations, as well as to the subsequent implementation of these accords… IMET has a long history in Turkey. Since 1950, 40 officers who have attended professional military education (PME) courses in the United States have subsequently achieved general/flag officer rank… These officers represent a nucleus of personnel who have been extensively exposed to United States' training and military doctrine as well as American society as a whole. Many times this number have received similar benefits through other technical or professional training courses in the U.S… According to [TGS Deputy Chief General] Saltık, these officers returned with a good knowledge of the U.S., U.S. military techniques, and the English language, which made them invaluable. ("Justification for IMET-Congressional" 1979a, November 19; brackets added)

The former Commander of the Turkish Air Force, Ergin Celasin, confirms the above-mentioned consequences of the PME programs:

[18] Military Assistance Programs the United States carried out primarily targeted military personnel. As Ronald. I. Spiers said in 1970, "a distinction is rarely made between civilian and military requirements, since local needs are all embracing." See Wolpin (1972, p. 15, footnote a). Therefore, 'Expanded IMET' (E-IMET) program started only in 1991 partly in response to criticisms that US training given to officers of other nations exacerbates civil-military relations in these nations. Training programs would now give more focus to training in human rights, civilian supremacy and democracy.

> Of course you are impressed by the quality of the job done in American military education and training programs such as IMET. These programs provide dialogue and Turkish officers attend these programs in other countries such as France as well. These exchanges allow you to get to know other systems and approaches. The acquaintances and dialogue earned during these programs may later facilitate better bilateral relations. Officers of other countries you take education with come to certain posts and your friendship allows getting things done faster than otherwise would be possible. For instance, when I was occupying an important seat in the Turkish Air Force Command, we had a problem with the parachutes of the F-4 jets and thanks to the fact that a friend of mine from the time of our education back in the US was in İncirlik we immediately solved this problem. American General Myers too was of great help in solving some of problems in NATO as General Myers became an advisor to NATO after his position as the SACEUR. (personal communication, July 23, 2015)

Former Commander of the Land Forces Hikmet Bayar had the same impression about particular benefits of professional education programs. He too suggested that when these programs are opened anywhere, the purpose is to get the brightest officer with the largest chance of going up the ladder in the military hierarchy. Oftentimes a country sends its select officers overseas for training and education. If you form friendships with these officers, you may address problems more easily when they return to his country and assumes larger roles. Bayar had known Joint Chiefs of Staff John M. Shalikashvili as they worked together in different NATO assignments and he used to host him and another general in his house for dinner. As he later became the Joint Chiefs and the Baku—Tbilisi—Ceyhan pipeline was on the national agenda, he saw him in one of my visits to the United States and lobbied him for US help in this project. Acquaintances matter (personal communication, August 8, 2015). Saeed Khalid, a former Pakistani Ambassador to Ankara (1988–1992), shared the benefits of military-to-military relationships. It provided links and easier connections between the two sides. Military training and education facilitated cooperation with the US counterparts as well (personal communication, June 4, 2016). While the former Secretary of Defense in the Obama Administration, Chuck Hagel, admitted the limitations of military training programs, he also pointed out that

> *…what personal relationships do is they provide a lubricant.* And *if that lubricant is not there in relationships, then there is no relationship.* And then it's just a straight kind of factual numbers business. And *personal relationships do sand some things down where at least you can get some antennas turned on.* And your receivers are on both ways, rather than just transmitting, you actually get a country's receiver turned on. (Italics added) (Clemons 2013)

Former Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök agrees with this assessment on the specific angle of these military training and education programs. According to him,

> all countries do this [offer training and education programs]. It was first the Roman Empire, which started this practice. They created the student exchange. They cherrypicked the brightest among the youth in other places, invited them to Rome, make them admire Rome and send them back home. These students were so well educated that when they went back home they rose to most prominent positions. There they observed the Roman interests. Romans sent their own students abroad to learn their characters and peculiarities and readjusted or modified their own politics. That is to say, all countries try to do the same thing. Italian schools, Austrian schools, American colleges have all this underlying rationale. (Özkök 2012, p. 4)

As argued before, creating additional opportunities for informal dialogue between military officers is considered a significant gain in regions such as the Middle East, East Asia, and Latin America, where militaries were important, if not the most significant, political actors. Hammer (2007) reports how Major General Shaukat Sultan Khan, who was President Musharraf's press secretary until March 2007 and spent six months in infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1983, explained the major benefit of US training programs for Pakistani officers. According to Shaukat Sultan Khan, Hammer reports, "it helps you to establish a better relationship and more understanding [of the US perspective]" and "It broadens your outlook" (2007). It is for the importance of training and education for military-to-military contacts that several Pakistani and US officials lamented the fact officers who joined the Pakistani military during Zia ul-Haq's era was cut off from education and training opportunities in the USA because of sanctions enforced on Pakistan. "Not only

was it [officers recruited during Zia period] deprived of advanced overseas training during its formative years, but this officer cohort was also denied exposure to the world outside till late in their careers, by which time their worldview had formed and in many cases become entrenched" (Nawaz in Lodhi 2011, p. 90; also Hammer 2007).

The close military-to-military relationship beyond military matters is at least partly attributed to training, education of senior Pakistani leadership has received in, and large amounts of military and economic aid and assistance it received from the USA. The US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott alluded to this point when he discussed the damage done to military training program by the 'Pressler sanctions' [dated 1985], banning all aid to Pakistan because Pakistan tested nuclear weapons. He said that this military training program had brought several promising young Pakistani officers to the USA and Jehangir Karamat, then COAS in Pakistan, himself had studied at the US Army's Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth. General Karamat told him that due to the sanctions he probably was the last Pakistani graduate [with US military education and training] who would reach the rank of COAS in Pakistan (Talbott 2004, p. 110). When Aslam Beg, the Commander of Pakistan Armed Services in 1990, visited Iranian Revolutionary Guards and rejected to cooperate with the United States in the First Gulf War because he thought that all US-friendly countries in the region would fall after the war and Iran and Pakistan would rise, the US Ambassador Oakley attributed this to cutting of US training to Pakistani officers some years before (Oakley 1999, p. 145).

A similar self-criticism was also made by US officials concerning the generation of officers who were left without IMET training due to sanctions enforced on Turkey. The US policy-making circles were worried that that "as we [the US] began our [their] assistance programs again [in 1979], there was a lot of concern expressed about the generation of military leaders in Turkey who reached field grade during that period and didn't have access to US training and US schools" during the embargo period from 1975 to 1979. The concern was that "most of the senior Turkish General Staff people had served in Korea. The Turks had a very big contingent in the Korean War, so the Turkish General Staff in those days felt very close to us. I don't know whether by now the group in the general staff who were at their formative point in their military

careers when we cut Turkey off from military assistance are in positions of authority" (Cotter 2002, p. 71).

Although IMET and other training and joint exercises do not create a subservient generation of officers in recipient countries (Schaffer and Schaffer 2011, p. 64), it does seem to increase the possibility through friendships and connections of earning the ear of these officers. According to Nogaylaroğlu (personal communication, June 9, 2015), "The US executes these [PME] programs all the way since the 1940s and 50s. By way of them it both introduces its country to foreign officers and finds contacts that are closer to itself". According to Taw, exposure to US culture, democracy, values allowed by IMET training may not translate into direct impact but "at the very least it provides a common language for negotiations" (Schaffer and Schaffer, p. 64; Taw 1994, p. xiv). "IMET offers no guarantee of far reaching capacity to alter recipient institutional values or governmental behavior. Practitioners speak instead of access, rapport, and ease of communication, terms used by some synonymously with "influence"… security assistance education and training "gives you access that you wouldn't or couldn't have without difficulty" that is, "access at the senior ranks of host country military establishments" (Cope 1995, p. 25). In other words, previous acquaintance and a history of working together in NATO offices or headquarters should make it more likely that a phone call by a high-ranking US general will be taken by his counterparts elsewhere. "The foreign military education and training experience in the United States builds what retired Lt. Gen. William E. Odom, USA, has called "subjective ties" with future military and often political leaders in other states. In 1993 Congressional testimony he recounted a personal experience:

> Another kind of desirable influence through IMET is demonstrated by US-Pakistani relations immediately after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. General Zia, the President of Pakistan, was being urged by his foreign minister to scorn US offers of assistance in favor of coming to term with Moscow. Because Zia had attended two US Army schools, and because he had made extremely close friends with ordinary American citizens during those two years, he was subjectively inclined toward the US offer. As a party to the meeting with him in Pakistan when he made the decision to accept the US offer, tying his policy to US strategy for Afghanistan, I gained the impression that his IMET experience was a critical factor in his decision. (Odom cited in Cope 1995, p. 26)

Lt. General William E. Odom reiterated his observations about the impact of IMET training on Zia ul-Haq. "General Zia in Pakistan twice an IMET visiting military student, did not take home great commitment to democracy, but he took back a great admiration for the United States and proved willing to resist advice in 1980 not to turn to the US for aid and foreign policy alignment" (Odom 1992, pp. 221–222). Once again, this link is hard to 'prove', unless there is chance to go back to Zia and ask if IMET made an influence on him to prefer aligning his policies with those of the USA or unless we sometime find in closed Pakistani archives his confession that if he had not been influenced by IMET he would have followed a different policy toward the USA. However, we do have US Embassy reporting on this about two weeks after General Zia took over in July 1977:

> Zia's two major excursions overseas affected him and color his views of the world. He has been to the states twice, attending the command and staff college at Fort Leavenworth and an armored course at Fort Knox. He is unabashedly pro-American and laudatory of many things American. He is not obsequious to the us; rather, he saw much in the states he admires and does not hide his friendship for America and Americans. This is reflected in his emphasis on the desirability of American equipment and technology and his interest in increasing the amount of training Pakistani officers receive in the states. ("A Profile of General Zia" 1977, July 21)

This explains why "success with such a program is very difficult to measure accurately in quantifiable ways" (Cope 1995, p. 42). In the following chapters on four cases of coups d'état in Turkey and Pakistan, this study will show the main benefits of US officials military training programs and where exactly their role should be located in making the sense of the role played by US officials in those military coups.

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